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INTRODUCTION 
 
Lawyers expect the tools of discovery in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure will extract relevant information from almost every source they 
can find.  At the same time they hope their own files will be protected from 
discovery by at least one of two familiar rules.  Many documents can be 
protected by asserting the attorney-client privilege, since Rule 26(b)(1) 
authorizes discovery only of “any matter, not privileged.”1  Other 
documents in counsel’s file will be litigation work product that can be 
withheld from routine discovery under Rule 26(b)(3) until there has been “a 
showing of substantial need . . . and that the party is unable without undue 
hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the material by other 
means.”2  As a result, in most cases an objection to discovery of a 
document in counsel’s files will not be challenged and judges will rarely be 
asked to decide whether some documents must be produced. 
Discovery disputes over documents in counsel’s file are not so rare in 
cases in which counsel represented the client during the transaction that led 
to the lawsuit.  Earlier representation makes it likely there will be a variety 
of confidential documents counsel created or edited with the expectation of 
a successful transaction, not litigation.  Some of these earlier documents 
may fit within the attorney-client privilege protection for a client’s 
confidential disclosures to counsel.  Other documents can best be described 
as transaction work product.  This latter category may include letters from 
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counsel to the client reporting facts counsel learned from the other party or 
facts learned from third parties through due diligence research about a 
planned deal, memoranda and drafts counsel sent to the client suggesting 
changes in documents for the proposed deal, or counsel’s memos or 
working papers that do not reveal what the client told counsel.  Transaction 
work product will not always be relevant, but in some cases it may be at the 
heart of the dispute.  For example, if the issue is when a party first had 
knowledge of a fact or received notice of an event, the critical information 
may have been revealed in a le tter from the party’s own counsel.  This 
material may resemble Rule 26(b)(3) work product but differ because it 
was prepared before litigation was anticipated. 
There is a substantial body of federal caselaw that examines whether 
transaction work product can be protected from discovery.  The caselaw  
will not be found under the topic “transaction work product” because no 
opinion uses that label, a simple fact that itself provides an important clue.  
As lawyers sort documents to determine which to produce and which to 
withhold, they apparently think only of the two familiar rules.  In fact, by 
limiting their analysis to the two familiar rules they are left with no choice.  
It seems unlikely that a transaction document will be found to have been 
created in anticipation of litigation as required by Rule 26(b)(3) to meet the 
definition of litigation work product.  That leaves the attorney-client 
privilege as the obvious ground, so lawyers regularly rely on that privilege 
and assert that the transaction documents they wrote or edited are protected 
from discovery by the attorney-client privilege.  Thus, the issue in the 
federal caselaw on discovery of transaction work product has been whether 
such material is privileged.  The federal courts have almost always held 
that the federal law of the attorney-client privilege does not protect 
documents that do not reveal the client’s confidential communications. 
The persistence with which lawyers continue to assert the attorney-
client privilege in the face of almost certain rejection of that ground by 
federal courts might appear at first to be just stubbornness, ineptitude, or 
dilatory avoidance of discovery obligations.  The working hypothesis 
explored in this Article is that none of those is the correct explanation, and 
that instead it is important to recognize this is an issue where both lawyers 
and judges have been misled from the start by the assumption that the two 
familiar rules are the only rules.  The familiar rules that regulate discovery 
of privileged documents and litigation work product do not provide correct 
answers for transaction work product.  Lawyers would be better able to 
recognize which transaction work product documents can be protected 
from discovery, and would be more successful in arguing that they are 
protected, if they recognized that transaction work product is a separate 
category of material not covered by the two familiar rules.  In the same 
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manner, judges could create more coherent and accurate doctrine if they 
developed a separate rule to regulate the discovery of transaction work 
product. 
As a theoretical question, this third option of a separate body of 
doctrine for the category of transaction work product has always been 
possible.  It is uncodified doctrine, so it does not require a new statute or an 
amendment to the Federal Rules.  It is solidly grounded on the United 
States Supreme Court’s 1947 decision in Hickman v. Taylor3 that first 
recognized a work product doctrine.  It remained viable after the partial 
codification of the doctrine in 1970 provided a textual basis for protecting 
litigation work product under Rule 26(b)(3).  As a practical question, 
however, the third option is not viable.  The possibility has been ignored 
for so long that the assumption that privilege and litigation work product 
are the only two options is solidly entrenched.  Even suggesting a third 
option appears almost heretical.  For that reason, it is important to sketch 
how the various doctrines are interrelated and to describe how this topic 
might be examined from a different perspective. 
The foundation for privilege law on this issue can begin with 
Hickman, an opinion which started from the premise that the attorney-client 
privilege did not protect either the statements counsel obtained from non-
client witnesses or the memoranda and writings prepared by counsel that 
did not reveal the client’s disclosures.4  In Upjohn Co. v. United States5 the 
Court held that the attorney-client privilege protected factual disclosures 
from employees of a corporate client to counsel, but assumed that counsel’s 
notes and memoranda would not be privileged if they contained material 
other than factual disclosures from the client.  A solid body of federal court 
decisions has filled out the framework of Hickman and Upjohn by holding 
that the attorney-client privilege protects both the confidential documents 
in which a client disclosed facts to counsel and confidential documents 
written by counsel that reveal the client’s factual disclosures.6  Under this 
traditional definition of the scope of the privilege, a typical transaction file 
will contain many documents that are privileged and not discoverable 
because they reveal the client’s disclosures to counsel.  If, however, the 
 
 3 329 U.S. 495 (1947). 
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871, 874 (4th Cir. 1984); In re Fischel, 557 F.2d 209, 211-12 (9th Cir. 1977); United States 
v. United Techs. Corp., 979 F. Supp. 108, 110-11 (D. Conn. 1997); Guzzino v. Felterman, 
174 F.R.D. 59, 60-61 (W.D. La. 1997); Johnson v. Rauland Borg, 961 F. Supp. 208, 211 n.5 
(N.D. Ill. 1997); Montgomery v. Leftwich, Moore & Douglas, 161 F.R.D. 224, 227 (D.D.C. 
1995). 
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transaction document does not directly or indirectly reveal the client’s 
disclosures to counsel, a discovery objection on the basis of the attorney-
client privilege will not succeed.7 
A smaller set of federal court decisions appears to provide greater 
protection for material in the transaction file.  These opinions have stated or 
held that the attorney-client privilege covers all advice to the client or any 
confidential communication to the client in the course of providing legal 
services.8  While many of these lower federal court decisions on closer 
reading turn out to be dictum or applications of state law in a diversity 
case,9 there are enough to create an impression of a split among federal 
courts between the traditional scope of the privilege that protects 
confidential documents only if they reveal the client’s disclosures, and a 
“broader” scope that protects most or all communications from counsel to 
client.10 
Some commentators label the traditional scope a “narrow” view and 
describe the federal courts as split between the narrower and broader 
scopes11 or among variations on them.12  The commentators tend to prefer 
the broader scope, but most devote little space to the issue.  One offers the 
unhelpful advice that the ruling on the issue will depend on whether “a 
particular court views the privilege as a benefit or burden.”13  The 
Restatement of The Law Governing Lawyers declares the broader scope is 
preferable but does not examine whether that is the federal rule; it also 
 
 7 See, e.g., Am. Standard v. Pfizer, 828 F.2d 734, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Christman v. 
Brauvin Realty Advisors, Inc., 185 F.R.D. 251, 255-56 (N.D. Ill. 1999); Midwestern Univ. 
v. HBO & Co., No. 96 C 2826, 1999 WL 32928, at *2-*4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 4, 1999); Athridge 
v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 184 F.R.D. 200, 204, 209 (D.D.C. 1998); Overseas Private Inv. 
Corp. v. Mandelbaum, No. CIV.A.97-1138CKK/JMF, 1998 WL 647208, at *2 (D.D.C. 
Aug. 19, 1998); Federal Election Comm. v. Christian Coalition, 178 F.R.D. 61, 66 (E.D. Va. 
1998); Evans v. Atwood, 177 F.R.D. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1997); Salgado v. Club Quarters, Inc., 
No. 96 CIV.383(LMM)(HBP), 1997 WL 227598, at *1-*2 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 1997); 
Ziemack v. Centel Corp., No. 92 C 3551, 1995 WL 314526, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 19, 1995); 
United States Postal Serv. v. Phelps Dodge Ref. Corp., 852 F. Supp. 156, 162 (E.D.N.Y. 
1994); In re Air Crash Disaster at Sioux City, Iowa, 133 F.R.D. 515, 518 (N.D. Ill. 1990). 
 8 See, e.g., Sprague v. Thorn Americas, Inc., 129 F.3d 1355, 1370 (10th Cir. 1997); 
United States v. Ramirez, 608 F.2d 1261, 1268 n.12 (9th Cir. 1979); Muller v. Walt Disney 
Prods., 871 F. Supp. 678, 682 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Arcuri v. Trump Taj Mahal Assocs., 154 
F.R.D. 97, 102 (D.N.J. 1994); United States v. Mobil Corp., 149 F.R.D. 533, 536 (N.D. Tex. 
1993); Fine v. Facet Aerospace Prods. Co., 133 F.R.D. 439, 444 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Pitney-
Bowes v. Mestre, 86 F.R.D. 444, 446 (S.D. Fla. 1980). 
 9 See infra notes 100-36 and accompanying text. 
 10 See In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 602-03 (N.D. Tex. 1981). 
 11 See, e.g., EDNA EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRODUCT 
DOCTRINE 40-46 (1997). 
 12 See generally 24 CHARLES WRIGHT & KENNETH GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE  § 5491 (1994). 
 13 Id. § 5491, at 454. 
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suggests that the differences between the two definitions of scope will not 
matter most of the time.14  These descriptions and preferences offer little 
help to a lawyer who must decide if the attorney-client privilege will 
actually protect a specific document, or to a federal judge who must decide 
whether to sustain a claim that a document is privileged.  For both lawyers 
and judges the practical questions are: which caselaw most accurately 
states the federal rule, how to determine whether a document meets the 
correct test, and whether there are any other limits on discovery of material 
that is not privileged. 
Both the extent of division in the federal courts over the scope of the 
attorney-client privilege and the actual support in the cases for the broader 
scope of the privilege have been much overstated by the commentators.  
The traditional scope may be labeled as the narrow view by some but it is 
still the more accurate definition of the scope of the privilege under federal 
law.  What has been labeled as the broader view should instead be called a 
distortion of the traditional scope of the privilege.  Only the traditional 
view provides the correct analysis when the attorney-client privilege is the 
ground for objecting to discovery of transaction documents that do not 
directly or indirectly reveal the client’s confidential disclosures to counsel.  
That, however, does not explain why lawyers keep invoking the privilege 
ground, nor does it explain why some judges and so many commentators 
encourage lawyers to continue to do so by questioning the viability of the 
traditional scope of the privilege. 
The support of judges and commentators for expanding the traditional 
scope of the privilege seems to be a product of the assumption that there 
are only two possible limits on discovery and the assumption that the only 
protection for non-privileged material is the codified language in Rule 
26(b)(3) for litigation work product.  These assumptions rest on a narrow 
and inaccurate reading of Hickman.  The work product doctrine became 
part of discovery law in Hickman after the Supreme Court held that 
confidential material created by counsel was not privileged if it did not 
reveal the client’s disclosures.  In the second part of Hickman, the Court 
held that some non-privileged but confidential material created by counsel 
should be protected from routine discovery, that some material might be 
discoverable on adequate grounds, and that discovery of the mental 
impressions or memoranda of counsel should be allowed only in “a rare 
situation.”15  The doctrine was “substantially incorporated”16 into Federal 
Rule 26(b)(3) in the 1970 amendments. 
 
 14 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 119 cmt i. and Reporter’s Note 
cmt. i Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996. 
 15 329 U.S. at 512-13. 
 16 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 398 (1981). 
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The birth of the doctrine in a case in which the facts involved 
litigation work product, and the doctrine’s partial codification in a rule for 
litigation work product, may make it appear to protect only litigation work 
product.  That appearance may have fostered a belief that privilege law was 
the only way to protect transaction work product, or at least an assumption 
that the uncodified law of attorney-client privilege was more open to 
revision than the interpretation of Rule 26(b)(3).  Those arguing for 
expanding the privilege have not mentioned that this effort to fill a 
perceived gap in the work product rule by changing the law of privilege 
would completely invert what the Court did in Hickman.  They also have 
not examined the anomaly of providing complete protection under a 
privilege for documents that do not meet the standards for qualified 
protection as work product. 
While the facts of Hickman, the Hickman doctrine, and Rule 26(b)(3) 
seem to blend together in the law of work product, the caselaw doctrine and 
language of the rule differ.  For example, in Hickman the material in 
dispute was created by counsel, but under Rule 26(b)(3) the work product 
may also be created by a party or a party’s representatives.  The expansion 
of the work product category in the Rule was limited by requiring the 
documents be prepared in anticipation of litigation and by a comment that 
it does not cover documents prepared “in the ordinary course of 
business.”17  That does not mean the same limit was part of the Hickman 
doctrine for documents created by counsel.  Anticipation of litigation might 
provide a useful dividing line if the facts involve accident reports in a tort 
case such as Hickman, but that does not mean that it will necessarily be the 
best dividing line if the facts of the litigation involve a transaction in which 
counsel created documents. 
There are a few opinions that do not regulate discovery of transaction 
work product under the privilege; instead they suggest expanding the other 
familiar rule that protects counsel’s files.  These opinions do no more than 
suggest an expansive interpretation of Rule 26(b)(3) by reading the 
“antic ipation of litigation” language to include documents prepared in 
advance of any lawsuit, which analyzed the likely outcome of litigation that 
might arise from a transaction, or were “prepared . . . because of the 
prospect of litigation.”18  While this interpretation could in time expand the 
codified part of the doctrine to include some transaction documents, this is 
an uncertain possibility at best because it goes far beyond the conventional 
reading of the language used in the Federal Rules. 
A third option of separate uncodified doctrine for transaction work 
 
 17 Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to 
Discovery, 48 F.R.D. 487, 501 (1970) [hereinafter 1970 Advisory Committee’s Note].   
 18 United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1202 (2d Cir. 1998). 
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product would allow the courts to develop more specific regulations for 
discovery of confidential documents in counsel’s transaction file.  Under 
this third option, confidential transaction documents written by counsel that 
do not reveal a client’s disclosures to counsel would remain outside the 
scope of the attorney-client privilege, but they still could be protected from 
routine discovery.  This option recognizes that there may be good reasons 
why an attorney’s transaction file should not be routinely discoverable.  
Furthermore, it provides a framework for examining that issue in a manner 
that does not distort the law of attorney-client privilege and does not 
overextend the language of the discovery rules. 
This Article will examine the proper scope of the attorney-client 
privilege, and consider how discovery of counsel’s transaction work 
product could be regulated under an uncodified branch of work product 
doctrine.  Part I of this Article will examine the foundation of the 
traditional scope of the attorney-client privilege established in Hickman and 
Upjohn.  Part II will examine the two lines of federal cases on the scope of 
the attorney-client privilege.  Part III will examine the commentary and the 
policy arguments that have been advanced for expanding the traditional 
scope of the privilege.  Part IV will describe the parameters of the 
uncodified-work-product policy that can be derived from Hickman and 
Upjohn.  The conclusion in Part V will consider how this third option 
might affect the law of privilege and discovery practice. 
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I. THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE SUPREME COURT 
Before the adoption of the Federal Rules in 1938 there was little 
reason to consider whether confidential transaction documents authored by 
counsel should be protected from discovery.  While lawyers created 
documents and wrote letters to clients before then, the Reporter for the 
Restatement notes that “[t]he question was largely irrelevant in an earlier 
legal culture that did not provide for pretrial discovery and in which calling 
a lawyer to the witness stand was very rare.”19  The classic treatment of the 
issue in Wigmore’s Evidence was entirely contained in a brief paragraph  
within discussion of the attorney-client privilege: 
§ 2320.  Communications by the attorney to the client.  That the 
attorney’s communications to the client are also within the privilege 
was always assumed in the earlier cases and has seldom been brought 
into question.  The reason for it is not any design of securing the 
attorney’s freedom of expression, but the necessity of preventing the 
use of his statements as admissions of the client . . . or as leading to 
inferences of the tenor of the client’s communications—although in this 
latter aspect, being hearsay statements, they could seldom be available 
at all . . . .20 
The fact that Wigmore emphasized protecting the client’s 
communications strongly suggests that the rule he described incorporates a 
further unstated assumption that the lawyer’s advice was based only on the 
client’s description of the facts or the client’s statement of goals for a 
transaction.  Since that unstated assumption would mean the lawyer did not 
learn any facts from others, the only relevant information that could be 
gleaned from counsel’s confidential documents would very likely provide 
clues about the client’s disclosures to counsel.  The rationale of protecting 
the client’s confidential disclosures, however, does not support the same 
scope for the privilege if counsel has acquired information in the course of 
investigating and gathering facts from sources other than the client.  For 
half a century the Supreme Court has consistently drawn a distinction 
between protecting information disclosed by the client and protecting 
information the lawyer obtained from some other source. 
A. The Foundation of Hickman 
When the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted in 1938, 
they permitted discovery of all relevant non-privileged information from 
opposing litigants and third parties; the Rules did not expressly exclude 
 
 19 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 14, at 359. 
 20 8 JAMES WIGMORE , EVIDENCE  § 2320 (John T. McNaughton ed., rev. 1961). 
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discovery of material contained within the files of opposing counsel.  A 
substantial disagreement arose very quickly among the lower federal courts 
about whether they should allow discovery of the material in opposing 
counsel’s files that had been prepared for litigation.21  As a result, in 1946 
the Advisory Committee proposed an amendment to Rule 30 that would 
limit discovery of such material: 
The court shall not order the production or inspection of any writing 
obtained or prepared by the adverse party, his attorney, surety, 
indemnitor, or agent in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for 
trial unless satisfied that denial of production or inspection will unfairly 
prejudice the party seeking the production or inspection in preparing 
his claim or defense or will cause him undue hardship or injustice.  The 
court shall not order the production or inspection of any part of the 
writing that reflects an attorney’s mental impressions, conclusions, 
opinions, or legal theories, or except as provided in Rule 35, the 
conclusions of an expert.22 
The Advisory Committee’s Note accompanying the proposed 
amendment summarized the holdings of the substantial body of caselaw; 
they ranged from a rule that such material was generally subject to 
discovery to a rule it was not subject to discovery at all.23  The Note gave 
specific attention to the pending case of Hickman v. Taylor in which the 
Supreme Court had just granted certiorari.24  It described the Third 
Circuit’s en banc holding that material prepared for trial was not 
discoverable, because it was within the scope of privileged documents, and 
noted that all but one member of the Advisory Committee questioned that 
view.25  The Note suggested that the privilege exception to discovery was 
limited to the traditional evidence privileges.  While the Supreme Court did 
not approve the amendment to Rule 30 proposed by the Advisory 
Committee,26 it did use Hickman v. Taylor both to adopt a limitation along 
the lines recommended by the Advisory Committee and to reject the 
resolution that had been adopted by the Third Circuit. 
Hickman v. Taylor involved a suit for damages by the estate of 
Norman Hickman, a crewmember of the tug John M. Taylor that sank in 
 
 21 See generally 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. M ILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE  § 2021 (1994). 
 22 Report of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts 
of the United States, 5 F.R.D. 433, 456-57 (1946) [hereinafter 1946 Advisory Committee’s 
Note]. 
 23 See id. at 458-60. 
 24 See Hickman v. Taylor, 153 F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. granted, 328 U.S. 876 
(1946). 
 25 See 1946 Advisory Committee’s Note, 5 F.R.D. at 460. 
 26 See Order Amending Rules of Civil Procedure, 329 U.S. 843 (1946). 
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the Delaware River from unknown causes.  The tug owners hired counsel 
almost immediately to represent them in the anticipated litigation.  During 
the next two months counsel for the owners obtained statements from the 
surviving crew members, interviewed other witnesses, and wrote 
memoranda of what they told him.  The discovery dispute arose a year later 
after Hickman sued and demanded production of those written statements 
of witnesses, counsel’s memoranda, and a summary of any oral statements 
of witnesses.  The defendant objected on the ground the material was 
“privileged matter obtained in preparation for litigation.”27  The trial court 
held the material was not privileged and ordered production of the material, 
allowing defense counsel the option to first submit counsel’s own 
memoranda to the court for review.28  The Third Circuit reversed and held 
the material was the “work product of the lawyer” and, therefore, 
privileged from discovery.29 
The Supreme Court rejected the privilege argument in a single 
paragraph: 
We also agree that the memoranda, statements and mental impressions 
in issue in this case fall outside the scope of the attorney-client 
privilege and hence are not protected from discovery on that basis.  It is 
unnecessary here to delineate the content and scope of that privilege as 
recognized in the federal courts.  For present purposes, it suffices to 
note that the protective cloak of this privilege does not extend to 
information which an attorney secures from a witness while acting for 
his client in anticipation of litigation.  Nor does this privilege concern 
the memoranda, briefs, communications and other writings prepared by 
counsel for his own use in prosecuting his client’s case; and it is 
equally unrelated to writings which reflect an attorney’s mental 
impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories.30 
The remainder of the majority opinion and the concurring opinion are 
the well-known foundation for the protection of the lawyer’s file as work 
product.  The scope of the work product policy will be explored in this 
Article in Part IV.  The present issue is whether anything more can be 
learned from the Court’s declaration that the material was not covered by 
the attorney-client privilege. 
While the Court noted it would not provide a full discussion of the 
attorney-client privilege, it is still possible to draw some additional insight 
from what the Court did and did not say, and from the surrounding 
circumstances.  Some elements of the privilege were not mentioned as 
 
 27 Hickman v. Taylor, 4 F.R.D. 479, 480 (E.D. Pa. 1945). 
 28 See id. at 482-83. 
 29 Hickman v. Taylor, 153 F.2d 212, 223 (3d Cir. 1945). 
 30 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947). 
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reasons for finding the material was not privileged, such as whether the 
documents were confidential or whether the attorney was providing legal 
services when he obtained the statements from the witnesses or 
summarized the information supplied by the witnesses.  The Court did set 
out the plaintiff’s argument that the witnesses were “third persons rather 
than . . . his clients,”31 and seemed to endorse that distinction when it noted 
that the privilege did not cover information “from a witness.”32  Similarly, 
when the Court stated that counsel’s own notes and other writings were not 
privileged, it did not provide any additional explanation.  The Court’s 
factual descriptions focused on counsel’s notes and writings about what he 
had learned from witnesses and not what he had been told by the tug 
owners, his clients.33  The Court’s approach to these topics further confirms 
it was applying a rule that a client’s disclosures to counsel could be within 
the privilege, but that information counsel learned elsewhere was not 
privileged. 
The proposed amendment to Rule 30 that was before the Court at the 
same time as Hickman was accompanied by an Advisory Committee 
description of the attorney-client privilege that was consistent with 
Wigmore’s broad formulation of its scope: 
Of course, it has been held that communications to an attorney by his 
client or advice given to a client by his attorney are privileged within 
the well settled meaning of that term in evidence and hence not the 
proper subject of inquiry.34 
Since the Court rejected the amendment to Rule 30 in favor of the 
caselaw approach in Hickman it did not have to expressly affirm, modify, 
or disavow this description of the privilege as including advice to the client 
in general.  It is clear that the Court did not follow this description of the 
privilege when it considered the facts of Hickman.  The Court never 
mentioned whether counsel’s notes and memoranda had been prepared for 
the client, seen by the client, or sent to the client as part of counsel’s advice 
regarding the progress of the litigation.  If any of those facts were thought 
sufficient to include counsel’s material within the privilege, the Court could 
have decided the case on that ground.  However, the Court did not do so, 
since it concluded that the information from a witness is not privileged 
without discussing whether a lawyer’s later inclusion of the non-privileged 
information in advice to the client would convert it into privileged 
information. 
Each of the three kinds of non-privileged material in the litigation file 
 
 31 Id. at 506. 
 32 See id. at 508. 
 33 See  id. at 498, 508. 
 34 1946 Advisory Committee’s Note, 5 F.R.D. at 458. 
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in Hickman might resemble material in a transaction file.  For example, the 
“information which an attorney secures from a witness”35 might resemble 
the facts about the transaction that counsel learns from third parties.  The 
“memoranda, briefs, communications and other writings prepared by 
counsel” 36 might be similar to preliminary drafts of transaction documents 
and editorial changes to documents by counsel.  The attorney’s “mental 
impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories”37 might be 
comparable to counsel’s internal memoranda that describe how and when 
the documents must be drafted or edited for the transaction in order to 
protect the client against various problems that might arise in the future. 
There are two reasons to remember that Hickman provides a 
foundation for defining the scope of the attorney-client privilege.  The first 
is that comparing a transaction document against the documents in 
Hickman provides a gauge of the kind of material that falls outside the 
privilege even though it was prepared by counsel in the course of providing 
legal services to a client and maintained with the same confidentiality as 
the client’s factual disclosures to counsel.  The second is that Hickman did 
not hold that all documents created by counsel are routinely discoverable 
just because they do not reveal the client’s confidential disclosures.  The 
Court recognized that there were strong policy arguments against discovery 
of counsel’s work product, but distinguished between absolute protection 
under the privilege and protection against routine disclosure under the work 
product doctrine.  This point calls for emphasis and repetition, because the 
arguments in the caselaw and commentary for expanding the scope of the 
privilege often seem to rest on a tacit assumption that there is only a stark 
choice between the privilege and no protection. 
B. The Court’s Version of the Evidence Rules 
The Supreme Court’s definition in Hickman of the scope of the 
attorney-client privilege remained in effect through the adoption of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence.  The Court’s adoption of the 1973 Rules had no 
permanent effect, because Congress suspended them before they took 
effect.38  Nevertheless, some commentators suggest that a trend toward a 
broader scope of the privilege includes the Court’s approval of a version of 
the attorney-client privilege that would “adopt the broader view and make 
the lawyer’s communications to the client privileged as well as the client’s 
 
 35 Hickman, 329 U.S. at 508. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 See 1 JACK WEINSTEIN & MARGARET BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE , at 
xix-xxi (J. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 1999). 
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communications to the lawyer.”39  While the Court in other areas has not 
felt bound to continue with positions it adopted in the 1973 Rules,40 those 
Rules could be considered somewhat persuasive authority if the 
commentators are correct.  Therefore, it is necessary to examine the 1973 
Rules to see if they can be described as part of this broadening trend. 
The 1973 Rules defined the privilege with language that could be read 
to cover all communications in both directions: 
Rule 503.  Lawyer-Client Privilege 
. . .  
(b) General rule of privilege.  A client has a privilege to refuse to 
disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential 
communications made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of 
professional legal services to the client, (1) between himself or his 
representative and his lawyer or his lawyer’s representative . . . . 41 
If that language extended the privilege to all documents authored by 
counsel and sent to the client, including documents that do not reveal the 
client’s confidential disclosures, it would negate the premise in Hickman.  
On its face the language is ambiguous, as one of the Court’s major opinions 
on the attorney-client privilege illustrates.  In Upjohn Co. v. United States42 
the Court used the broader phrase “communications between an employee 
and counsel” as a substitute in the very same paragraph for the narrower 
phrase, “communications by Upjohn employees to counsel,” that described 
its actual holding.43  Ambiguous language is not persuasive authority that 
the Court understood and intended that the 1973 language would reject 
Hickman, especially since neither that effect nor Hickman itself were 
mentioned anywhere in the Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 503.  
Nonetheless, neither that effect nor Hickman itself were mentioned 
anywhere in the Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 503. 
In any event, the Court’s 1973 Rules never became effective because 
they were suspended by Congress for further study.44  In the subsequent 
Congressional enactment of the Rules, the governing language for each 
specific privilege was replaced with a short statement that privileges “shall 
be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be 
 
 39 2 CHRISTOPHER M UELLER & LAIRD KIRKPATRICK , FEDERAL EVIDENCE  324 (2d ed. 
1994). 
 40 Compare FED. R. EVID. 505(a), reprinted in 56 F.R.D. 183, 245 (Proposed Official 
Draft 1972), with Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980). 
 41 FED. R. EVID. 503, reprinted in 56 F.R.D. 183, 235-36 (Proposed Official Draft 
1972). 
 42 449 U.S. 383 (1981). 
 43 449 U.S. at 397. 
 44 See Act of Mar. 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9 (1974). 
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interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and 
experience.”45  That language left Hickman as the Court’s authoritative 
statement of the scope of the privilege under the common law. 
In the Supreme Court’s next discussion of the attorney-client 
privilege, decided shortly after the adoption of the final version of Rule 
501, the Court still described the privilege as protecting only disclosures by 
clients to their attorneys.  The issue in Fisher v. United States46 was 
whether the attorney-client privilege protected tax records the client had 
transferred to the attorney in the course of seeking legal advice.47  The 
Court held that transferring the records to the attorney did not give them 
any more or less protection from a government summons than if the client 
had retained them.48  The opinion described the privilege in a manner fully 
consistent with Hickman: 
Confidential disclosures by a client to an attorney made in order to 
obtain legal assistance are privileged . . . .  The purpose of the privilege 
is to encourage clients to make full disclosure to their attorneys . . . .  
As a practical matter, if the client knows that damaging information 
could more readily be obtained from the attorney following disclosure 
than from himself in the absence of disclosure, the client would be 
reluctant to confide in his lawyer and it would be difficult to obtain 
fully informed legal advice.  However, since the privilege has the effect 
of withholding relevant information from the factfinder, it applies only 
where necessary to achieve its purpose.  Accordingly it protects only 
those disclosures necessary to obtain informed legal advice which 
might not have been made absent the privilege.49 
The consistent emphasis on protecting the client’s disclosures and 
applying the privilege only where it will protect the client’s disclosures 
does not support an argument that the Court intended to broaden the 
protection of the attorney-client privilege to include all communications 
from the attorney to the client.  The same emphasis also reaffirms that the 
entirety of an attorney’s file is not necessarily protected by the attorney-
client privilege.  If the purpose of providing legal services is not a 
sufficient ground for including documents a lawyer obtained from the 
lawyer’s own client within the privilege, that purpose alone will likewise 
not be a sufficient ground for including documents obtained from third 
parties within the privilege. 
 
 45 FED. R. EVID. 501. 
 46 425 U.S. 391 (1976). 
 47 See id. at 403. 
 48 See id. at 396, 402. 
 49 Id. at 403. 
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C. Adding to the Foundation in Upjohn 
The Supreme Court reaffirmed that Hickman still provided a 
foundation for the scope of the attorney-client privilege when it addressed 
the privilege in the corporate context in Upjohn Co. v. United States.50  The 
most prominent issue in Upjohn was whether the attorney-client privilege 
should include factual information disclosed to the corporate attorney by all 
employees of the corporate client or just factual information disclosed to 
the corporate attorney by members of the “control group” for the 
corporation.  The Court’s holding, that the privilege included factual 
disclosures to the attorney by all employees of the client,51 resolved the 
question of discovery for most of the disputed material.  The Court, 
however, also had to consider whether there was any other protection for 
material that was not covered by the privilege. 
One category of other material consisted of factual disclosures to the 
corporate attorney by former employees of the corporate client about their 
activities when they had been employed.52  The Court declined to decide 
whether that material was privileged, because the issue had not been 
addressed by the lower courts.  While the Court’s brief footnote53 did not 
explore the issue, the best explanation assumes the continued validity of the 
premise of Hickman.  If a former employee is considered a representative 
of the corporate client when they discuss what they did while employed, 
the factual disclosure is privileged.  The factual disclosure is not privileged 
if the former employees are considered to be third party witnesses, which is 
how the employees of the noncorporate defendant in Hickman were 
viewed. 
The second category of other material in Upjohn was notes and 
memoranda that corporate counsel described as containing “what I 
considered to be the important questions, the substance of the responses to 
them, my beliefs as to the importance of these, my beliefs as to how they 
related to the inquiry, my thoughts as to how they related to other 
questions.”54  The Court concluded that the attorney-client privilege 
covered material that corporate counsel described as “any notes reflecting 
responses to interview questions”55 by employees of the corporate client, 
but the Court explained that it was still necessary to consider the work 
product doctrine because the privilege would not cover “notes and 
memoranda of interviews [that] go beyond recording responses to his 
 
 50 449 U.S. 383 (1981). 
 51 See id. at 394-95. 
 52 See id. at 394 n.3. 
 53 See id. at 397 n.6. 
 54 Id. at 400 n.8. 
 55 Id. at 397. 
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questions.”56  Again, the distinguishing feature between the material that 
was privileged and the material that was not privileged was the source of 
the content of the material.  Even though the Court expressed no doubt that 
the attorney made the notes in order to provide legal services, and 
expressed no doubt that the notes were confidential, this was not enough to 
make them privileged.  The critical element was the source of the 
information for the notes, since the notes that needed some protection other 
than the privilege were the notes that did not record the responses of the 
corporate employees. 
There is some language in Upjohn that can be used in support of a 
broader scope for the attorney-client privilege,57 but the context indicates 
that the Court did not intend to modify the foundation set out in Hickman.  
While the Court noted that the privilege exists to protect both “the giving of 
professional advice” and “the giving of information to the lawyer,”58 the 
Court did not hold that all fact gathering by a lawyer is covered by the 
privilege.  That statement was made in discussing whether the privilege 
covered disclosures by all corporate employees or disclosures by just the 
control group. The Court’s holding was limited to fact gathering from 
employees of a client. 
Similarly, while the Court at one point summarized its holding on the 
scope of the privilege by broadly describing “communications between an 
employee and counsel,”59 that phrase was used only as the equivalent in the 
same paragraph for the narrower description of “communications by 
Upjohn employees to counsel.”60  The facts of the case never raised an 
issue about when a communication from counsel to an employee would be 
privileged.  The actual holding stated only that communications by Upjohn 
employees to counsel would be privileged, a holding fully consistent with 
Hickman’s premise that communications in the other direction from 
counsel will not always be privileged. 
D. The Privilege after Swidler & Berlin 
The Court’s most recent opinion on the attorney-client privilege was 
the well-publicized case, Swidler & Berlin v. United States.61  While the 
facts of this case did not raise the specific issue of interest here, the Court’s 
approach reaffirms that the lessons learned from the earlier cases are still 
 
 56 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 397 (1981). 
 57 See, e.g., In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 601-03 (1981); 1 SCOTT STONE & 
ROBERT TAYLOR, TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES 1-80 n.307 (2d ed. 1995). 
 58 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 390. 
 59 Id. at 397. 
 60 Id. 
 61 524 U.S. 399 (1998). 
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correct.  The case arose out of the Special Prosecutor’s investigation of 
certain White House actions.62  In the course of the investigation a federal 
grand jury focused on the actions of former Deputy White House Counsel 
Vincent Foster, who had died nine days after meeting with an attorney to 
obtain legal representation.63  During the two hours they met, Foster’s 
attorney made three pages of handwritten notes.64  When the grand jury 
issued a subpoena for the notes, the law firm moved to quash it on the 
grounds of the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine.65  
After examining the notes, the district judge quashed the subpoena.66  The 
court of appeals held that the attorney-client privilege did not always 
survive the death of the client and that the privilege could be set aside 
under a balancing test.67 
The Supreme Court ruled that the notes could be withheld from the 
grand jury because the attorney-client privilege survived the death of the 
client.68  This holding was based on the unquestioned proposition that the 
notes, although written by the attorney, would have been privileged if the 
client still had been alive, because the attorney made them during the client 
interview and discovery of the notes would have revealed the content of the 
client’s confidential disclosures.69  The Court’s holding is consistent with 
Hickman and Upjohn, even though there was no need to revisit the issues 
raised in those cases.  In addition, the Court’s proposition that the 
“common law rule embodied in the prevailing caselaw”70 should not be 
overturned without a sufficient showing of the wisdom of the change 
affirms that Hickman and Upjohn still provide the foundation. 
II. THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN FEDERAL CASELAW 
The lower federal courts have generally applied the attorney-client 
privilege to material within the scope defined by the Supreme Court, but 
the caselaw must be read with care.  Opinions may not distinguish between 
different ways of phrasing a rule when the facts or the arguments of the 
parties do not suggest the difference will really matter, so it is of little help 
to count how many opinions may describe the privilege as protecting a 
lawyer’s advice or a client’s disclosures.  Just summarizing the cases may 
 
 62 See id. at 401. 
 63 See id. at 401-02. 
 64 See id. 
 65 See id. at 402. 
 66 See id. 
 67 See Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 402; see also In re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d 230 
(D.C. Cir. 1997). 
 68 See Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 410-11. 
 69 See id. at 408. 
 70 Id. at 411. 
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give a false impression that there is more disagreement than actually exists 
or suggest that an interpretation is supported by more authority than can be 
actually marshaled.  It is important, therefore, to survey the cases in 
sufficient depth to identify the mainstream body of authority and at least 
account for the major variations. 
A. The Traditional Scope of the Privilege 
For half a century one of the most influential federal court opinions on 
this topic has been the district court opinion of Judge Wyzanski in United 
States v. United Shoe Machine Corporation.71  In this civil antitrust action 
the government proposed to introduce a number of letters that were legal 
opinions United Shoe had received from independent lawyers.72  While 
United Shoe had surrendered the letters in response to a subpoena, the 
parties had stipulated that this would not waive the privilege.  Although 
United Shoe argued that all letters from counsel to their client were 
privileged, Judge Wyzanski drew a distinction.73  He agreed that all the 
letters were from lawyers giving legal advice, but that did not mean that all 
the letters were privileged.74  The important distinction was the relationship 
between the client’s privileged disclosures to counsel and the content of 
each letter, with the privilege protecting letters based on the client’s 
disclosures: 
[I]n so far as these letters to or from independent lawyers were 
prepared to solicit or give an opinion on law or legal services, such 
parts of them are privileged as contain, or have opinions based on, 
information furnished by an officer or employee of the defendant in 
confidence . . . .75 
In contrast, Judge Wyzanski held that a letter would not be privileged 
if the advice was based on facts the attorney learned from someone other 
than the client and cited the then recent decision of the Supreme Court in 
Hickman:76  
Thus, for example, there is no privilege for so much of a lawyer’s 
letter, report, or opinion as relates to a fact gleaned from a witness, . . . 
or a person with whom defendant has business relations, . . . or a public 
document such as a patent . . . or a judicial opinion.77 
Judge Wyzanski’s opinion was rather brief, but in succeeding decades 
 
 71 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950). 
 72 See id. at 359. 
 73 See id. 
 74 See id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 See id. 
 77 United Shoe v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 359 (D. Mass. 1950). 
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his general outline of the attorney-client privilege became a “much quoted 
formulation”78 and his exclusion from the privilege of documents that did 
not reveal the client’s disclosures was followed in many opinions.  For 
example, the Second Circuit relied on United Shoe in concluding that the 
privilege “protects only those papers prepared by the client for the purpose 
of confidential communication to the attorney or by the attorney to record 
confidential communications,”79 and that “a communication from an 
attorney is not privileged unless it has the effect of revealing a confidential 
communication from the client to the attorney.”80  District judges, likewise, 
relied on United Shoe to conclude that the privilege “extends to the 
attorney’s legal advice and opinions which encompass the thoughts and 
confidences of the client,”81 but that it “does not cover an attorney’s 
communications . . . which are based upon conversations with third 
parties”82 and “does not extend to opinions of counsel which are unrelated 
to any [confidential] communication by the client.83 
As other courts applied and rephrased the United Shoe distinctions or 
applied them to other questions, there came opinions that described the 
privilege more broadly as covering all confidential communications from a 
lawyer to a client.  Whether the scope of the privilege was this extensive 
was discussed at length in two mid-1970s district court opinions.  In United 
States v. IBM,84 Chief Judge Edelstein began with an analysis of United 
Shoe and concluded: 
[T]he focus of the privilege must be on protecting confidential 
information revealed to the lawyer by the client . . . .  And in resolving 
the question of the extent to which the lawyer’s communications to the 
client are privileged, the courts have focused on the need to protect the 
confidentiality of what the client revealed to the lawyer. 
. . . .  
. . . IBM has cited a series of cases which assertedly stand for the 
proposition that all communications made by the attorney to the client 
are privileged.  However, a careful reading of these cases suggests that 
any more expansive protection is based on the desire to protect 
confidential communications made by the client to the lawyer.85 
 
 78 Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 637 (2d Cir. 1962). 
 79 Id. at 639. 
 80 United States v. Silverman, 430 F.2d 106, 122 (2d Cir. 1970). 
 81 Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 37 (D. Md. 1974). 
 82 Foley v. Vanderbilt, 65 F.R.D. 523, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
 83 Congoleum Indus. v. GAF Corp ., 49 F.R.D. 82, 86 (E.D. Pa. 1969). 
 84 66 F.R.D. 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
 85 Id. at 211-12. 
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In SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp.,86 then-District Judge Newman framed 
one issue as whether “the privilege protects all advice from attorney to 
client, or only advice that reveals (by adoption or implication) a fact 
communicated in confidence by the client to the attorney.”87  Judge 
Newman concluded that the privilege category did not include all advice 
from counsel, because the caselaw from United Shoe to IBM that had 
applied the traditional scope of the privilege had not been superseded by 
the smaller number of cases that suggested the privilege could cover all 
legal advice.88  Judge Newman did acknowledge the argument that the 
proposed Federal Rules of Evidence would have protected all 
communications from the attorney, but did not find the argument 
persuasive because the Advisory Committee’s Note neither mentioned the 
issue nor explained why the proposed rule adopted the broader position.89  
Judge Newman concluded there was “no reason to broaden the privilege 
beyond the narrow standard as set forth in United Shoe.”90 
Judge Newman also considered the related issue of whether the 
privilege protected the memoranda in counsel’s files that had not been sent 
to the client.  He applied both Hickman and United Shoe to hold that the 
memoranda would be privileged “if they reveal information supplied in 
confidence by the client” but that memoranda that did not do so would not 
be protected by the privilege.91 
In the following years the D.C. Circuit generated much of the caselaw 
because the scope of the attorney-client privilege was often an issue in 
cases in which an agency asserted the privilege as a ground for resisting 
demands for documents under the Freedom of Information Act.92 In the 
first case in this series, Mead Data Central, Inc. v. United States 
Department of the Air Force,93 the issue was whether the Air Force had to 
disclose documents that dealt with negotiations between the Air Force and 
West Publishing over the use of the copyrighted West key number 
system.94  Some of the documents were legal opinions from Air Force 
attorneys that provided advice about both the law and possible courses of 
action.  The D.C. Circuit agreed with the district court that privileged 
material could be withheld from disclosure but disagreed with the lower 
court’s conclusion that the privilege covered all confidential 
 
 86 70 F.R.D. 508 (D. Conn. 1976). 
 87 Id. at 520. 
 88 See id. at 520-22. 
 89 See id. at 522. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. at 523. 
 92 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1996). 
 93 566 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
 94 See id. at 247-48. 
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communications between attorney and client.95  The court stressed the 
importance of identifying the source of the information in the lawyer’s 
opinion letter by noting that: 
[i]n the federal courts the attorney-client privilege does extend to a 
confidential communication from an attorney to a client, but only if that 
communication is based on confidential information provided by the 
client.96 
In subsequent Freedom of Information Act cases, the D.C. Circuit 
adhered to the holding in Mead Data  that the privilege applies to letters 
from the attorney to the client only if the attorney’s letter is based on 
confidential information provided by the client.97  The D.C. Circuit 
continued to build on that foundation when it applied the same rule on the 
scope of the attorney-client privilege to criminal investigations in which 
witnesses resisted grand jury demands for documents: 
Communications from attorney to client are shielded if they rest on 
confidential information obtained from the client.  Correlatively, “when 
an attorney conveys to his client facts acquired from other persons or 
sources, those facts are not privileged.”98 
Discovery disputes about the scope of the attorney-client privilege 
still continue to produce a solid body of current caselaw from federal 
appellate courts and federal trial courts in which the opinions start with the 
proposition that communications from an attorney to a client are protected 
by the attorney-client privilege only to the extent that they reveal a client’s 
confidential communications.99  As the authority cited in support of this 
proposition is traced back, sometimes in several steps through the caselaw 
described above, it is clear that the foundation is still Hickman and the 
Supreme Court’s definition of the scope of the attorney-client privilege.  
The next questions are why there is a body of federal caselaw that seems to 
suggest the privilege is broader and whether the privilege should be broader 
than the traditional scope. 
 
 95 See id. at 248. 
 96 Id. at 254. 
 97 See Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 862-64 (D.C. Cir. 
1980); Brinton v. Dep’t of State, 636 F.2d 600, 603-04 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
 98 In re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d 94, 99 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 99 See, e.g., United States v. Under Seal, 748 F.2d 871, 874 (4th Cir. 1984); In re Brand 
Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., No. 94 C 897, MDL 997, 1995 WL 663684, at *3 
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 6, 1995); In re Air Crash Disaster at Sioux City, Iowa, 133 F.R.D. 515, 518 
(N.D. Ill. 1990). 
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B. Indicia of a Broader Privilege in Federal Court 
The federal court opinions that seem to suggest a broader scope for 
the attorney-client privilege can be sorted into at least three major 
categories, with each category defined by the reason for rejecting the 
opinion as persuasive authority on the scope of the privilege under federal 
law.  One category, which might be labeled “dicta,” contains cases in 
which a court made a generalized statement that the privilege includes legal 
advice but did not focus on the specific question of interest here.100  A 
second category, which might be labeled “unsupported,” contains cases in 
which the conclusion depends on a combination of misinterpretation of 
Supreme Court opinions and failure to recognize the applicability of those 
opinions.101  A third category, which might be labeled “diversity,” contains 
cases that are applying the privilege law of a state in a diversity case as 
required by Federal Rule 501 and, therefore, do not provide guidance on 
the scope of the federal privilege.102 
An important example of the first category is United States v. 
Amerada Hess Corp.,103 a Third Circuit opinion from 1980 that seems to 
suggest that the privilege should cover all advice from counsel to client, 
even if the advice does not reveal any confidential disclosures made by the 
client.  The issue arose when Amerada resisted an Internal Revenue Service 
summons that was part of an investigation of possible bribes to foreign 
officials and the way those bribes were treated on tax returns.104  Amerada 
had ordered an internal investigation by a committee of four outside 
directors, with outside counsel interviewing fifty officers and employees in 
order to obtain information for the committee.105  Amerada had turned over 
the committee report, but refused to turn over the report by counsel to the 
committee or the list of persons the lawyers had interviewed.106  The IRS 
did not seek the lawyer’s report, but it did seek the list of fifty 
interviewees.107  Amerada’s contention that the list was protected by the 
 
 100 See, e.g., United States v. Neal, 27 F.3d 1035, 1048 (5th Cir. 1994); In re Grand Jury 
Investigation, 974 F.2d 1068, 1070 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Defazio, 899 F.2d 626, 
635 (7th Cir. 1990); Wells v. Rushing, 755 F.2d 376, 379 n.2 (5th Cir. 1985); United States 
v. Amerada Hess Corp., 619 F.2d 980, 985-87 (3d Cir. 1980). 
 101 See, e.g., In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 601-03 (N.D. Tex. 1981). 
 102 See, e.g., Sprague v. Thorn Ams., Inc., 129 F.3d 1355, 1368-69 (10th Cir. 1997); In 
re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 965 (3d Cir. 1997); Nat’l Educ. Training Group, Inc. v. 
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 107 See id. at 983. 
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attorney-client privilege was rejected by the district court on two 
grounds.108  First, the court determined the privilege did not apply to 
communications from an attorney to a client.109  Second, the court decided, 
even if the privilege did apply, the list was not privileged.110 
The Third Circuit rejected the trial court’s first ground, because it was 
clearly wrong to exclude all legal advice or all communications by counsel 
to client from the protection of the privilege.111  The circuit court still 
affirmed the trial court because the list of witnesses was not legal advice at 
all nor did it disclose the contents of a confidential communication from 
the client to its attorneys.112  The opinion must be read carefully because, at 
the time, the Third Circuit was applying its “control group” test for 
determining which disclosures by corporate employees were covered by the 
privilege.  In its holding on the scope of the privilege the Third Circuit 
cited Hickman and drew the distinction that is still critical between 
documents that might reveal the attorney’s investigation and documents 
that might reveal a client’s confidential disclosures to the attorney.113  
While this pre-Upjohn opinion said that the list did not reveal what anyone 
“in the control group” for Amerada told counsel about any potential 
witness, the list itself is described as a list of names which did not reveal 
what anyone at Amerada had told counsel.  The court’s holding that an 
attorney’s investigative work is not within the privilege is a direct 
application of Hickman. 
The Amerada opinion, on the other hand, also seems to support the 
position that the privilege protects all confidential communications in both 
directions between client and counsel: 
Two reasons have been advanced in support of the two-way application 
of the privilege.  The first is the necessity of preventing the use of an 
attorney’s advice to support inferences as to the content of confidential 
communications by the client to the attorney  [8 Wigmore on Evidence 
§ 2320 (McNaughton Rev. 1961)].  The second is that, independent of 
the content of any client communication, legal advice given to the 
client should remain confidential  [United States v. Bartone].114 
This quotation is not a particularly strong precedent in support of 
applying the privilege to communications in both directions.  Besides being 
dictum that does not support the actual holding, it is expressly only a 
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description of two reasons that have been “advanced” and not a declaration 
that the second reason is sufficient to support the asserted proposition.  The 
quotation from Wigmore was examined earlier.115  The citation to Bartone 
adds almost nothing because the issue was never raised in that case and it is 
discussed there only in the most oblique way.116  While the listing of the 
two reasons provides a useful quotation or citation for the proposition that 
the federal courts apply the broader scope of the privilege, the opinion itself 
points to no additional supporting authority.  For example, one state court 
opinion suggested that the Third Circuit’s opinion shows that “[n]ot all 
decisions of the Federal Courts have followed” Hickman but did not 
examine whether that was the actual holding of Amerada.117 
An example of both the first and second categories, because it 
combines dictum and unsupported assertion, is the district court opinion in 
the case of In re LTV Securities Litigation.118  In this case the discovery 
dispute concerned documents generated by outside counsel in the course of 
investigating accounting problems at LTV; LTV resisted disclosing the 
documents to stockholders who had brought a securities fraud class 
action.119  The court describes the documents as reports and 
communications from counsel to senior management at LTV that disclosed 
information outside counsel had learned from interviewing LTV 
employees.120  As the court itself noted, Upjohn had held that all factual 
disclosures from LTV employees to counsel, not just factual disclosures by 
the control group, were covered by the privilege.121  Since those disclosures 
were apparently what the plaintiffs were demanding in discovery, and 
would be covered by the traditional scope of the privilege, there was no 
need to consider whether the privilege would have a broader scope in a 
different setting. 
Nevertheless, the court discussed whether there is a difference in the 
application of the privilege for communications from the attorney to the 
client.122  After noting several of the decisions that had developed the 
traditional rule, the court declared that the rule fails to protect client 
disclosures adequately and that it does not recognize the fact-gathering role 
of the attorney.123  The court then asserted that the federal courts do not 
follow the traditional rule: 
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A broader rule prevails in the federal courts, a rule that protects from 
forced disclosure any communication from an attorney to his client 
when made in the course of giving legal advice.124 
The authorities cited in support of this conclusion do not include 
Hickman nor the caselaw that applied Hickman.  Instead, the policy 
grounds rested on then the recent decision in Upjohn and its emphasis on 
the importance of factual investigation to providing legal advice: 
[A]n attorney can be asked directly about the substance of unprivileged 
communications received from third parties and cannot resist disclosure 
on grounds that such information was later conveyed to the client 
unless, of course, this information was obtained by the attorney as part 
of an investigation necessary to give legal advice.  To the extent prior 
decisions have denied privilege to such data they must give way to 
Upjohn.  The linchpin of privilege then is not necessarily whether the 
facts were relayed from attorney to client because they can be 
privileged under Upjohn even if they were not.  Instead, the focal point 
is the purpose of the lawyer in gathering the data.125 
The fault in this analysis is the assertion that Upjohn replaced 
Hickman’s test of the source of the information in counsel’s 
communication with a test based on the purpose for which counsel obtained 
that information.  Upjohn assumed only that the purpose was an essential 
element, since the privilege does not cover exclusively nonlegal or business 
advice; Upjohn did not treat that purpose as a sufficient element.126  In 
retrospect it is clear that on the specific facts of In re LTV Securities the 
Court’s discussion is dictum because the source for all the information is 
described as being various employees of LTV.  Since the reports by 
counsel to LTV were setting out privileged information learned in 
confidential disclosures from LTV’s employees, it would have been 
protected by the traditional scope of the privilege.  Similarly, Upjohn 
emphasized that factual disclosures to counsel could be covered by the 
privilege because fact-gathering was an important part of a lawyer’s 
function, but it did not hold that all fact-gathering by counsel was protected 
by the privilege.  If it had, there would have been no reason in Part III of 
Upjohn to discuss the lesser protection of work product for such non-
privileged information. 
An example of all three categories, because it includes dictum, 
unsupported assertion, and state evidence law, is provided by a recent 
opinion from the Tenth Circuit in Sprague v. Thorn Americas, Inc.127  In 
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this employment discrimination case the former employee sought a 
memorandum that had been prepared by a staff attorney for the employer 
and sent to senior management.  The attorney had mentioned the 
memorandum to another employee, but the trial court did not order the 
employer to disclose it.  On appeal the court held that it was protected from 
discovery by the attorney-client privilege.128  Once again this result might 
well be supported by a straightforward application of Upjohn.  From the 
facts mentioned in the opinion it appears that the staff attorney based his 
advice on what he was told by corporate employees and what he learned 
from corporate personnel data.129 Since the staff attorney was responsible 
for the human resources department, reading the advice would necessarily 
disclose what the lawyer learned in confidential disclosures protected by 
Upjohn. 
Again the court did not stop with Upjohn, but instead offered its own 
view on whether the privilege protects communications from counsel that 
do not reveal the client’s confidential communications.  With citations to 
Amerada and In re LTV Securities, the court concluded that the Tenth 
Circuit had adopted the broader rule two decades earlier, even though the 
earlier case had actually done no more than reject the argument that the 
privilege did not cover any communication from an attorney.130  Instead of 
examining the issue in any greater depth this time, the court turned for 
further support to Kansas law, which the court interpreted as following the 
broader rule.131  Since the case involved both claims under federal law and 
Kansas law the case presented the complicated issue of how to apply 
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 when the same evidence may be privileged 
under one body of law but not privileged under the other.132  Rather than 
address that issue, the court concluded that the law was the same and relied 
heavily on Kansas law.133 
There is a substantia l body of similar federal caselaw on the scope of 
the attorney-client privilege that is actually based on state law.134  
Sometimes the court is explicit that it is following state law, but that fact is 
not always apparent.  As a result, it is easy to overlook the issue and 
assume that an opinion in a diversity case is persuasive on the scope of the 
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privilege in federal court, when Federal Rule of Evidence 501 instead 
commands the federal court to apply state law.135  This is an issue on which 
the states may follow a different rule, and several important states clearly 
do that.136  The variation among the states can provide relevant evidence in 
any search for the best rule, but it is still important to differentiate between 
diversity cases and those cases that establish the federal law of the 
privilege. 
There is no need to catalog every federal court opinion on this issue.  
It is sufficient to note the need to read the federal caselaw with care when 
addressing the specific question of the scope of the privilege under federal 
law.  An attorney seeking to protect transaction documents under the 
attorney-client privilege must temper the strongly held hope that there is a 
solid body of caselaw in support of the broader scope of the privilege with 
the disappointing reality that the authority of the precedent for the broader 
scope will evaporate upon careful analysis. 
III. THE POLICY ARGUMENTS ON THE SCOPE OF THE PRIVILEGE 
The variety in the caselaw raises important questions for both 
attorneys and federal judges.  If the traditional scope still defines the 
federal privilege, lawyers should not assert the privilege as a basis for 
withholding documents that do not reveal a client’s confidential 
disclosures.  When lawyers do withhold documents from discovery and 
invoke the privilege as the basis for doing so, they should assert that the 
document reveals a client’s confidential disclosures and be prepared to 
support that assertion.  Federal judges applying the privilege within its 
traditional scope should continue to reject claims of privilege for 
documents that are described only as “providing legal services” or “legal 
advice to client,” because those labels are not an assertion that a document 
will reveal a client’s confidential disclosures.  On the other hand, if the 
federal rule includes all communications from a lawyer to a client, then 
those labels will be sufficient to support the privilege and federal judges 
should sustain the claim of privilege.  By themselves the lower court 
opinions cited in support of the broader scope seem insufficient to 
outweigh the caselaw from the Supreme Court and other federal courts that 
supports the traditional scope of the privilege, particularly since the 
opinions do not examine why the federal courts should abandon the 
traditional scope.  So why is there an issue? 
On this topic the secondary literature tends to support a broader scope 
for the privilege under federal law even though the federal court cases do 
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not, and does so in a way that may provide lawyers or judges with less 
guidance than they have come to expect.  Many authors give this topic little 
attention at all, and for lawyers in particular a brief discussion can easily be 
misleading.  Lawyers have an ethical obligation to preserve a client’s 
confidences and secrets.137  Even though the ethical duty is broader, the 
privilege can readily be invoked to protect all documents found in a 
lawyer’s files from casual or unauthorized inquiries.  A proper discovery 
request can be resisted only on a ground such as privilege, and at that point 
the lawyer resisting discovery may turn to the treatises for authority to 
support an instinctive response to withhold the document.  For that 
audience a description of the caselaw can make the broader rule appear to 
be more accepted than it is, and a description of lower court opinions alone 
can make them seem more authoritative than they are.  As a result the 
lawyers who rely on the literature for a short summary of the law may be 
unprepared to assert the privilege correctly and will find they must 
eventually produce documents that do not fall within the traditional scope 
of the privilege. 
In addition, both lawyers and judges will find limited help for arguing 
or deciding whether the privilege should continue to be defined by its 
traditional scope or expanded to provide broader protection.  While the 
policy prescriptions that are offered by many commentators clearly prefer 
less discovery of a lawyer’s files and more protection for documents such 
as transaction work product, the reasons have not been examined in any 
depth in the literature.  This section will first review the discussions in the 
literature and then examine the arguments the commentators present for 
expanding the attorney-client privilege to protect documents that do not 
reveal a client’s confidential communications. 
A. How the Treatises Describe the Caselaw 
The new editors of Weinstein’s Federal Evidence state in a heading 
that the “Privilege Protects Both Communications From Client to Counsel 
and Communications From Counsel to Client.”138  That description of the 
law will appear supportive to a reader trying to withhold a document such 
as a letter from counsel to the client, especially if the reader gives less 
attention to the end of the first sentence of the text which declares that this 
is true if the requirements of the privilege are met.139  That misreading is all 
too likely because there is no immediate reminder that those requirements 
exclude from the privilege “information obtained by the attorney from third 
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parties . . . or from public documents or other public sources,” an 
explanation that comes three pages later.140  Instead, the footnote to the 
main statement summarizes several lower court opinions, including the 
opinions in Amerada and In re LTV Securities that are so frequently cited in 
support of the broader scope for the privilege.141  There is no caution that 
the language quoted from Amerada may be no more than dictum, no 
explanation of why the district court opinion in In re LTV Securities would 
be more authoritative than the opinions of the Supreme Court, and no 
mention at all of Hickman and Upjohn.  While the footnote also cites and 
summarizes some of the cases that applied the traditional scope of the 
privilege, the reader is given no warning that the cited cases are 
inconsistent and the treatise offers no explanation for resolving the 
inconsistency. 
Mueller and Kirkpatrick’s Federal Evidence142 discusses the topic 
with similar brevity, but with more than description.  These authors briefly 
set out the traditional scope and the broader view, and declare the “trend of 
modern authority is toward recognition of a two-way privilege covering all 
confidential communications between the attorney and the client in the 
course of legal representation.”143  Their declaration of a trend is not well 
documented.  The first court of appeals opinion they cite is from the 
District of Columbia Circuit, which still applies the traditional scope of the 
privilege and does not protect all communications.144  The second court of 
appeals opinion they cite is actually only dictum on this issue, and a reader 
consulting the opinion itself will find that the snippet quoted in the treatise 
does not accurately summarize the full discussion.145  The authors also cite, 
as a comparison, a quotation from Part I of the Upjohn opinion about the 
purpose of the privilege to encourage communication between attorneys 
and clients.146  That is a misleading quotation in this context because 
Upjohn did not hold that this purpose made all communications from 
counsel privileged; Part II of Upjohn made explicit that the Court did not 
accept what these commentators describe as the trend.147  They also declare 
that the proposed Federal Rules adopted the broader view148 but cite no 
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authority for that statement and do not discuss the cases that have 
questioned that position.  Finally, they list two policy arguments:  A 
broader rule will be more efficient because there will not be factual 
disputes, and it will allow attorneys to “speak more freely with their clients 
without concern” of compelled disclosure.149  They present no further 
support for these policy arguments.   
The commentary in Wright and Graham’s volume on the Federal 
Rules of Evidence150 is quite critical of the other treatises.  It describes 
Weinstein’s Federal Evidence as “non-committal” with footnotes that “give 
a quite distorted view of the federal caselaw”151 and describes the first 
edition of Mueller and Kirkpatrick’s Federal Evidence as “an equally 
skewed presentation of the precedents.”152  A similar criticism might be 
directed to this treatise as well, since it cites no authority in asserting that 
the “[r]ejected Rules [made] all attorney communications privileged.”153 
and does not document its conclusion that the Advisory Committee 
proposal was “rejecting narrower formulations of the privilege.”154  The 
treatise does arrange the various versions of the scope of the privilege for 
an attorney’s communications to the client in order: Those that reveal the 
client’s confidences, those just based on the client’s confidences, any that 
contain a lawyer’s advice, and finally, any legal communication from a 
lawyer.155  While many of the usual courts of appeal cases are cited, the 
issue is not examined, there is no attempt to reconcile the different cases, 
and the Supreme Court goes unmentioned.  Instead, the reader is told that 
California follows the broader view.  There is a brief mention of policy 
arguments suggesting that the traditional scope may require nice 
distinctions and factual inquiries, while the broad rule may not be 
necessary to an effective privilege, but there is no effort to defend either.  
The lawyer seeking guidance on the federal law is left with little more than 
commiseration and good wishes: 
The choice is by no means clear cut and decisions may turn on the 
degree to which a particular court views the privilege as a benefit or a 
burden to the legal system.156 
Wright and Graham’s discussion points out how the commentary in 
McCormick on Evidence has changed over the years.  The original 1954 
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edition endorsed the traditional scope of the privilege, with no more than a 
grudging concession that a communication from counsel might also be 
protected if it would reveal the client’s own communication or be an 
implied communication of the client, and expressed hostility to extending 
the privilege to other communications.157  In 1972 the revisers of 
McCormick’s Handbook of the Law of Evidence softened that position with 
a caution that “the matter is not free from difficulty,”158 and in the later 
editions there was further change.  McCormick  on Evidence now declares 
that the “simpler and preferable rule, adopted by . . . the better reasoned 
cases, extends the protection of the privilege also to communications by the 
lawyer to the client.”159  The text neither expressly includes nor excludes 
the federal law of the privilege within this conclusion, but the footnote 
presents the federal cases of Amerada and In re LTV Securities as the 
primary authority.160 
The full meaning of the advice in the 1999 version of McCormick on 
Evidence is unclear, because the following paragraph decla res that the 
privilege should not include “information obtained from sources other than 
the client,”161 but neither that paragraph nor the preceding one discusses 
which rule should be paramount if both situations exist.  Transaction work 
product often involves a confidential document in which the attorney told 
the client what counsel learned from a third party or gave advice to the 
client based on information counsel learned from a third party on a specific 
issue.  The reader may well interpret the discussion as meaning that if both 
situations exist, the transaction work product should be covered by the 
privilege, because that is how the text summarizes what it labels the “better 
reasoned” cases.  The only federal cases cited are Amerada and In re LTV 
Securities, but the discussion provides no explanation of why these two 
cases should be considered better reasoned than all the cases that support 
the traditional scope originally endorsed by Dean McCormick, nor any 
mention of the cases that do support his original position.  The only other 
reason for changing Dean McCormick’s endorsement of the traditional 
scope is that the broader rule is “simpler.”162  Whether it is simpler is not 
examined in the current edition, but it will be considered here shortly. 
The lawyer or judge who looks beyond these treatises will find 
authors who provide other surveys, both longer and shorter, of the caselaw 
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from the lower federal courts163 or practicing lawyers who present 
arguments for protecting their files from discovery.164  While this 
commentary provides more material to read, it may still be more 
misleading than helpful.  Creating the impression that there are equally 
authoritative cases supporting either the traditional scope or a broader 
scope does not help a lawyer identify the correct rule.  Listing various cases 
without trying to reconcile and explain them will leave lawyers wondering 
how to support the privilege if they do invoke it to protect transaction 
documents.  Similarly, noting an array of decisions is not enough to prepare 
a judge to interpret the precedent correctly.  By ignoring the Supreme 
Court’s decisions and generally declining to examine the debate over the 
scope of the privilege, these authors suggest that this is a topic the Supreme 
Court has left to the lower courts without guidance.  The issue that is left 
virtually unexplored is whether there is any authority or any compelling 
reasons for the lower federal courts to abandon the traditional scope of the 
privilege that was endorsed by the Supreme Court in Hickman and Upjohn. 
The lawyer or judge who takes Wright and Graham’s endorsement of 
the California position165 as a suggestion to seek more guidance from state 
law will be unlikely to find much help in evaluating the policy arguments.  
The state law that applies the broader scope of the privilege is likely to 
depend on specific statutory language.  For example, in California a 
confidential communication is defined as including “a legal opinion formed 
and the advice given by the lawyer.”166  That language was proposed by the 
California Law Revision Commission three decades ago with this 
comment: 
The lawyer-client, physician-patient, and psychotherapist-patient 
privileges all protect “information transmitted” between the parties . . . .  
In addition, the physician-patient and psycho-therapist-patient 
privileges protect “information obtained by an examination of the 
patient.” . . . .  It has been suggested that the quoted language [of the 
present statutes] may not protect a professional opinion or diagnosis 
that has been formed on the basis of the protected communications.  If 
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unprotected, the privileges would be virtually destroyed.  Therefore, 
[the three statutes] should be amended to make it clear that such 
opinions and diagnoses are protected by these privileges.167 
Because the comment lumps all three privileges together for a 
common solution of the potential problem it describes, it is hard to view the 
California position on this issue as being based on any unique feature of the 
relationship between lawyer and client.  It also creates a remedy that 
exceeds the stated rationale by protecting all opinions of the three kinds of 
professionals, because some of those opinions might not be based on a 
protected communication.  In a similar fashion, the statute in Washington 
includes the “advice given” by an attorney as within the privilege,168 but 
there is little supporting analysis of any policy in the caselaw.  A Tenth 
Circuit opinion recognized that Kansas law provides that a privileged 
communication includes “advice given by the lawyer” and quickly asserted 
that the circuit followed the same rule without attempting to fully account 
for all federal caselaw.169  Even if the opinion was correct about Kansas 
law, it did not present any arguments that lawyers could use to convince 
other federal judges about the proper scope of the privilege under federal 
law. 
B. Assessing the Arguments for the Broader Scope 
The arguments for applying the broader scope of the privilege have 
been sketched so briefly in the literature that they provide little except 
assertions.  Because the caselaw offers even less analysis, these arguments 
should be canvassed to see how much support they might provide.  The 
first is a policy argument: That a broader scope furthers the objective of the 
privilege by encouraging the client to seek advice from counsel and to 
inform counsel of all relevant information.170  This argument suggests that 
counsel should be able to assure the client that all disclosures are privileged 
and that they will be protected from being revealed even indirectly.  The 
second is an efficiency argument: That a broader scope will reduce the 
number or complexity of discovery disputes over the issue.171  The third is 
an argument about effect: That a broader scope will make so little 
difference in what is discoverable that there is no reason to jeopardize 
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client confidence in the protection afforded by the privilege and no reason 
to waste judicial resources on parsing the distinction between the client’s 
disclosures and the attorney’s advice.172  While each argument might 
support limits on routine discovery of some documents on specific facts, 
the primary and more difficult question is whether they support the 
proposition that the scope of the privilege should include all 
communications from a lawyer to a client. 
The first argument starts with the propositions that a lawyer should be 
able to assure the client that the client’s disclosures are protected and that 
the lack of assurances will affect a lawyer’s ability to provide legal 
services.  The propositions, however, seem to be employed for a broader 
conclusion.  Even under the traditional scope of the privilege, the lawyer 
can assure the client that most of their exchanges will be protected, because 
the privilege clearly protects both the client’s confidential disclosures and 
any advice or response by the lawyer if it directly or indirectly reveals the 
client’s disclosures.  If the lawyer does not perform any factual 
investigation of outside sources, then any advice or response based on the 
client’s description of the facts will be privileged, because it would reveal 
directly or indirectly what the client disclosed to the lawyer.  A lawyer may 
have to invest extra time and care to separate advice based only on the 
client’s disclosures and reports of counsel’s factual investigations, but a 
lawyer who assures the client that this will be done can likewise guarantee 
confidentiality for the client’s factual disclosures under the traditional 
scope of the privilege. 
The first argument also depends on an implicit assumption that this 
issue about the scope of the privilege is the only exception that would 
prevent a lawyer from providing solid assurance about the scope of the 
privilege.  If the lawyer will become actively involved in setting up the 
transaction with the client, the issue of whether the lawyer’s legal advice is 
protected by the privilege is not always going to be the only question, or 
even the most important question, about the scope of the privilege.  Under 
federal law the privilege at most protects legal advice and does not protect 
business advice or nonlegal services that are wholly separable from the 
legal advice.173  As a result, there is also a risk that a document in the 
transaction file  will be considered business advice and not protected by the 
attorney-client privilege, or that an inquiry from the client will be found to 
be a request for business services and not a privileged communication 
seeking legal advice.  Even if assurances to the client about the privilege 
are important, broadening the scope of the privilege to include the lawyer’s 
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non-litigation work product does not mean that the lawyer will be able to 
assure the client of complete confidentiality under the privilege. 
The second argument also depends on an implicit assumption, in this 
case that there is a version of the privilege that will require significantly 
less judicial fact-finding.  Although it will often seem that a different rule 
could be more easily applied in the case in which the dispute has arisen, 
changing the rule will still require judicial fact-finding in cases affected by 
the new rule.  A rule that avoids the need for any fact-finding might seem 
reasonably fair if it could be applied to facts that cannot easily be altered by 
the parties, but that is not the setting in which this privilege rule is applied.  
Attorneys will know the parameters of the rule and will have strong 
incentives to create facts that maximize the protection provided by the 
privilege.174  A rule that protected every document in a lawyer’s file could 
be easily applied, but it would make the lawyer’s file a sanctuary for third 
party documents and non-legal business advice.  A rule that protected every 
document that included any legal advice could also be easily applied, but it 
would also protect summaries of third party information.  Unless counsel’s 
own conduct or assertions are going to be considered sufficient to establish 
the scope of the privilege, there will always be factual disputes at the 
margin of any rule. 
The third argument, that the broader scope of the privilege will not 
have much effect, is most powerful under an assumption that lawyers are 
not very involved in factual investigations of transactions for their clients.  
It loses its power if the privilege issue concerns documents in which a 
lawyer did report on factual investigations.  The lawyer’s report to the 
client about public information or third person statements may be very 
significant, even if it does not indirectly reveal anything about the client’s 
own disclosures to counsel. Although in many cases the information in the 
lawyer’s report may also be obtainable directly from the client by 
deposition or document discovery, that may not be as powerful or accurate.  
For example, the disputed issues might be when a party learned about a 
certain fact and whether the party should have realized the importance of 
that fact.  If the party learned that fact when their counsel reported on the 
results of an investigation into public information or third party interviews, 
that report will be very relevant even though it does not reveal what the 
client told counsel.  Similarly, if the party learned that fact when their own 
counsel reported on facts they had been told by the other party to the 
transaction, that report will be relevant even though it does not disclose 
what the client told counsel. 
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These arguments, sketched in the literature without any supporting 
empirical data, add little support to the case for the broader scope of the 
privilege.  As for any issue for which there is little hard data, who wins this 
argument may depend on who has the burden of persuasion.  These 
arguments might serve as a starting point if the issue was unsettled with 
conflicting lines of precedent of equal authority, but they are not sufficient 
to negate the long history behind the traditional scope of the privilege or 
the precedential value of the Supreme Court opinions. 
Perhaps the arguments set out in the literature should be viewed from 
a somewhat different perspective, as assertions that such products of the 
lawyer’s work should not be routinely discoverable.  Excluding transaction 
work product from routine discovery would not provide the absolute 
protection of a privilege, but it would still respond to the main thrust of 
each argument.  Clients could be given assurances about the privilege, 
because any complete assurance always would have to acknowledge the 
various limits and exceptions of privilege doctrine.  There would be good 
reason to expect that discovery demands would not often create disputes for 
the court to resolve if the rule started with the proposition that such 
material is not routinely discoverable.  The concern about the balance 
between the need for discovery and the long term effect on the role of 
lawyers would not be ignored, because it would be a factor in defining the 
situations where nonroutine discovery would be permitted. 
The structure of the attorney-client privilege under federal law does 
not provide any readily available body of rules for doing the kind of 
balancing that would exclude routine discovery of the lawyer’s work and 
advice found in the transaction file, but permit discovery where it was 
needed and appropriate.  Such rules could be developed, but they may not 
be necessary if another body of doctrine could be developed from the 
dormant principles that the Supreme Court has already established for non-
litigation work product. 
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE 
There are two related reasons to ask whether confidential documents a 
lawyer generates while representing a client in a transaction could be 
protected from discovery by an uncodified branch of work product doctrine 
instead of by the attorney-client privilege.  If these documents have at least 
work product protection, then they would not be routinely discoverable and 
there would be less reason to protect them by expanding the scope of the 
attorney-client privilege.  If these documents do not get even this limited 
protection, then the reasons for that conclusion might also be relevant to 
defining the scope of the attorney-client privilege.  This question has not 
been asked often, so there is not an extensive body of caselaw that might 
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provide a direct answer.  Instead, it is valuable to examine how the law 
might evolve from the foundation already set in place. 
A. A Second Look at Supreme Court Precedent 
At its origin in Hickman the work product doctrine was described in 
terms that can be read in more than one way.  From one perspective it 
might appear that the Court was invoking an implicit limitation on what 
could be demanded under the discovery rules it had recently adopted, while 
from another perspective it might appear that the Court was adopting a rule 
to protect the litigation process.  Perhaps the Court was doing both and 
even more.  If the doctrine is a limitation on the reach of the discovery 
rules, then litigation may be a necessary condition to create the duty to 
comply with a discovery demand but not a necessary element of what is 
protected.  If the doctrine protects only the litigation process, then litigation 
will be both a necessary condition for that duty and a necessary element of 
what is protected. 
Considering the possibility of protecting non-litigation work product 
five decades after Hickman and three decades after the adoption of Rule 
26(b)(3) is difficult, because both the case and the rule focus attention on 
the work product doctrine as a discovery rule that is applied in a litigation 
setting.  As a result, there is a tendency to think of work product as a 
doctrine invoked by litigators during litigation to protect only their work as 
litigators and not to protect legal work performed during the underlying 
transaction.  There is typically little occasion to think about the doctrine 
outside the setting of litigation, because without litigation there is usually 
no compulsion to disclose confidential material.  That still leaves open the 
possibility that the work product doctrine could be invoked in litigation to 
protect the work of lawyers who worked on the transaction before there 
was any expectation of litigation.  A survey of the language of Hickman 
will help illustrate what is at least a possible alternative reading of this 
precedent. 
Some language in Hickman describes a general limit on the discovery 
rules, and does so in a way that could apply to any kind of material.  For 
instance, the Court states that “discovery, like all matters of procedure, has 
ultimate and necessary boundaries . . . .”175  The Court continues:  “In our 
opinion, neither Rule 26 nor any other rule dealing with discovery 
contemplates production under such circumstances . . . .  [The material] 
falls outside the arena of discovery . . . .”176 
Other language in the opinion describes a limit on discovery of the 
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work of lawyers with language that could equally apply to the files of 
litigators in particular or of all attorneys in general: 
Not even the most liberal of discovery theories can justify unwarranted 
inquiries into the files and mental impressions of an attorney. 
. . . .  
. . . When Rule 26 and other discovery rules were adopted, this Court 
and the members of the bar in general certainly did not believe or 
contemplate that all the files and mental processes of lawyers were 
thereby opened to the free scrutiny of their adversaries.  And we refuse 
to interpret the rules at this time so as to reach so harsh and 
unwarranted a result.177 
A third selection of quotations from the opinion can be presented to 
show the Court’s focus on the work of litigators and protecting the 
litigation process: 
[The demand] contravenes the public policy underlying the orderly 
prosecution and defense of legal claims. 
. . . .  
. . . [T]he general policy against invading the privacy of an attorney’s 
course of preparation is so well recognized and so essential to an 
orderly working of our system of legal procedure that a burden rests on 
the one who would invade that privacy to establish adequate reasons to 
justify production . . . .178 
The opinion began by defining the problem as discovery of material 
prepared “in the course of preparation for possible litigation”179 and clearly 
remained focused on “written materials obtained or prepared by an 
adversary’s counsel with an eye toward litigation . . . .”180  The policy 
arguments sketched in the opinion, however, could apply equally to 
litigators or all lawyers: 
Examination into a person’s files and records, including those resulting 
from the professional activities of an attorney, must be judged with 
care.  It is not without reason that various safeguards have been 
established to preclude unwarranted excursions into the privacy of a 
man’s work. 
. . . .  
Not even the most liberal of discovery theories can justify unwarranted 
inquiries into the files and the mental impressions of an attorney. 
. . . .  
 
 177 Id. at 510-14. 
 178 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-12 (1947). 
 179 Id. at 497. 
 180 Id. at 511. 
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In performing his various duties, however, it is essential that a lawyer 
work with a certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion 
by opposing parties and their counsel.  Proper preparation of a client’s 
case demands that he assemble information, sift what he considers to 
the relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and plan 
his strategy without undue and needless interference.  
. . . 
This work is reflected, of course, in interviews, statements, 
memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental impressions, personal 
beliefs, and countless other tangible and intangible ways—aptly though 
roughly termed by the Circuit Court of Appeals in this case. . . as the 
“work product of the lawyer.”  Were such materials open to opposing 
counsel on mere demand, much of what is now put down in writing 
would remain unwritten.  An attorney’s thoughts, heretofore inviolate, 
would not be his own.  Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices 
would inevitably develop in the giving of legal advice and in the 
preparation of cases for trial.  The effect on the legal profession would 
be demoralizing.  And the interests of the clients and the cause of 
justice would be poorly served.181 
When the Hickman opinion discussed whether the defendants could 
be required to produce counsel’s memoranda that recorded the oral 
statements of witnesses or whether the defendants could be required to 
repeat what counsel learned in oral interviews and did not write down, the 
language described a policy argument that could apply broadly to the work 
of all lawyers: 
Under ordinary conditions, forcing an attorney to repeat or write out all 
that witnesses have told him and to deliver the account to his adversary 
gives rise to grave dangers of inaccuracy and untrustworthiness . . . .  
The standards of the profession would thereby suffer. 
. . . .  
. . . [Petitioner’s reason] is insufficient under the circumstances to 
permit him an exception to the policy underlying the privacy of 
Fortenbaugh’s professional activities.182 
There may not be a single interpretation that can be cla imed to capture 
the only true meaning of Hickman, because there is support in its language 
for more than one conclusion about the extent of work product protection.  
It is also important to recognize that this opinion did not bind the work 
product doctrine to any fixed standard or any single policy argument.  The 
Court was not interpreting a statute nor eliciting an interpretation of a well-
developed body of caselaw.  Instead, the opinion was imposing a limiting 
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interpretation on the discovery rules the Court itself had recently adopted. 
When the Court applied Hickman in Upjohn,183 the litigation setting 
was substantially different.  Upjohn involved an attempt by the IRS to 
enforce a summons to obtain certain records from the company and certain 
information from its counsel, but neither the records nor the information 
were the product of any litigation at the time they were created.184  Instead, 
the materials were created before there was any litigation but after Upjohn 
had learned about “questionable payments” during an audit of a foreign 
subsidiary.185  In response, Upjohn’s chairman of the board had directed 
Upjohn’s general counsel to conduct an investigation and had ordered its 
employees to cooperate.186  There was no litigation at the time, and no 
litigation until after Upjohn submitted a report about the payments to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission and the Internal Revenue Service.187  
Even then, there was no litigation about Upjohn’s taxes or securities 
filings.188  The only litigation was the suit by the IRS to enforce the 
summons.189  Upjohn appealed from the district court’s order to produce 
the material and asserted that the materials were both privileged and work 
product.190  In its opinion on appeal, the court of appeals considered the 
work product argument only in a concluding footnote that stated that the 
work product doctrine did not apply to an IRS administrative summons.191 
What the Supreme Court did in Upjohn had the effect of applying the 
work product doctrine to protect material that had been created before there 
was any litigation.  Perhaps the company should have anticipated that the 
corporate conduct they asked counsel to investigate would inevitably lead 
to some kind of litigation, but the Court’s opinion did not even discuss 
whether the materials were prepared in anticipation of litigation.  That 
result is clear on the facts of the case, but it is also a result that has been 
almost ignored in the evolution of work product doctrine.  The important 
question is why. 
The Upjohn opinion did not have to extensively discuss whether the 
work product doctrine could protect confidential material created by 
counsel outside of litigation, because the government conceded that the 
doctrine did apply and chose to argue that it had made a sufficient showing 
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to support the discovery ordered by the lower courts.192  The government’s 
concession may have been the wisest tactic, because the statement by the 
court of appeals that work product was not applicable at all was supported 
only by a string citation to six cases.  Of these six cases, five were opinions 
that did not directly discuss work product,193 and one was an opinion that 
assumed work product might be applicable but which found the particular 
document in that case was not work product.194  The Supreme Court’s 
discussion, however, appears to accept the government’s concession as 
covering not only the question of whether the work product doctrine 
generally applied to IRS summonses, but also to the further question of 
whether it applied to the specific facts of Upjohn. 
The Upjohn opinion did not examine whether the material was work 
product under any specific language of Rule 26(b)(3); it also did not 
articulate a test or explain why the actual material could be described as 
having been created in anticipation of litigation.  In addition, the Court did 
not find it necessary to specify whether it was invoking the work product 
rule of Rule 26(b)(3), the doctrine of Hickman, or both.  Rather, the Upjohn 
Court declared broadly that the tax summons was “subject to the traditional 
privileges and limitations”195 including the work product doctrine, which it 
noted was both “substantially incorporated”196 and “codifie[d]”197 in Rule 
26(b)(3). 
The Court’s discussion of the work product issue focused on the 
government’s argument that it had made a sufficient showing to obtain 
work product and that the magistrate had properly ordered production of 
the memoranda and notes created by Upjohn’s general counsel.198  The 
Court specifically held that the Magistrate’s ruling was error and held that 
discovery of counsel’s material should not be governed by the “substantial 
need” and “without undue hardship” standards listed in the first part of 
Rule 26(b)(3).199  The Supreme Court likewise made clear that it was not 
going to define precisely the standard of protection for material that did not 
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fall into that category of the rule.200  Instead, the Court remanded the case 
because the court of appeals had thought there was no protection at all and 
the Magistrate had given the material too little protection.201  The Court did 
not base this resolution on any specific language of the Rule but, rather, 
invoked both the Rule generally and the uncodified work product doctrine 
based on Hickman: 
The notes and memoranda sought by the Government here, however, 
are work product based on oral statements . . . .  To the extent they do 
not reveal communications, they reveal the attorney’s mental processes 
in evaluating the communications.  As Rule 26 and Hickman make 
clear, such work product cannot be disclosed simply on a showing of 
substantial need and inability to obtain the equivalent without undue 
hardship.202 
The Court’s reasoning for providing a higher level of protection to the 
specific work product in Upjohn did not focus on the litigation process 
alone: 
Forcing an attorney to disclose notes and memoranda of witnesses’ oral 
statements is particularly disfavored because it tends to reveal the 
attorney’s mental processes . . . . 
. . . .  
. . . [T]he Hickman court stressed the danger that compelled disclosure 
of such memoranda [based on oral statements of witnesses] would 
reveal the attorney’s mental processes.203 
Equally important as what the Court did in Upjohn may be what it did 
not do, particularly the omission of certain language of the Advisory 
Committee’s Note from the 1970 amendments.  At that time the committee 
included this sentence about the extent of Rule 26(b)(3): 
Materials assembled in the ordinary course of business, or pursuant to 
public requirements unrelated to litigation, or for other nonlitigation 
purposes are not under the qualified immunity provided by this 
subdivision.204 
Although a quick reading of this sentence may suggest that it negates 
any limitation on discovery of material that is unrelated to litigation, that 
interpretation is contrary to what the Court held in Upjohn.  Part III of the 
Upjohn opinion is an important reminder that it is equally plausible to read 
the Advisory Committee’s Note describing Rule 26(b)(3) as no more than a 
partial codification of work product doctrine, with language that governs 
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only material related to litigation.  That would mean the federal courts 
should look beyond the language of the rule if the issue is whether there is 
any protection for material unrelated to litigation.  That would be consistent 
with the structure of the Upjohn result, where the Court invoked the 
language of the rule to describe the trial judge’s duty to limit discovery of 
“the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories of an 
attorney”205 but left the extent of the protection to further evolution by 
caselaw. 
The result in Upjohn can also be read as evidence that litigation is no 
more than a necessary condition to the applicability of work product 
doctrine, because the client did not need a ground to resist the IRS demand 
for its counsel’s confidential documents until the Government filed the 
action to enforce the administrative summons.  Certainly the Court did not 
make any effort to define litigation as a necessary element of what is 
protected.  While litigation may always be in prospect any time a taxpayer 
does anything affecting tax liability, the Court did not mention whether 
that, or similar facts, would be enough to find that the documents were 
assembled by counsel in anticipation of litigation.  This silence is tacit 
confirmation that an uncodified work product doctrine that protected 
transaction documents would not be inconsistent with the framework 
established by Hickman and Upjohn. 
There have been other Supreme Court opinions on issues related 
closely enough to require a brief mention, but none of the opinions clearly 
limit the doctrine to litigation work product alone.  In United States v. 
Nobles,206 an armed robbery case, the Court considered whether a criminal 
defendant could rely on work product to defeat an order by the trial court to 
provide a defense investigator’s report to the prosecutor after the 
investigator testified for the defense to impeach an earlier prosecution 
witness.207  After the Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning 
that the order was barred by the Fifth Amendment, it addressed the 
defendant’s alternative argument that the report was protected as work 
product.208  The Court accepted the proposition that the work product 
doctrine applied in criminal cases, citing Hickman as authority.209  Not 
surprisingly, since the case involved a document created for litigation, the 
discussion focused on protecting work product in litigation.210  The Court 
then noted it was not necessary “to delineate the scope of the doctrine” 
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because the defense had waived any protection.211 
While some lower courts have cited the discussion in Nobles for the 
proposition that work product protects “only” material prepared in 
anticipation of litigation, in each instance the citing court itself has added 
the “only” to the actual language of Nobles.212  The most the Court actually 
said was that the work product doctrine was “grounded in the realities of 
litigation [one of which is] that attorneys often must rely on the assistance 
of investigators and other agents . . . .”213  That language explained that an 
investigator’s report could be protected, but even on that subject the 
statement was dictum because the defense had waived any protection.  
There was no need to even consider whether work product doctrine could 
apply outside of litigation in a criminal case, because there is no obvious 
analog to transaction work product in an armed robbery case such as 
Nobles.  Nobles, therefore, should not be considered dispositive of the 
issue. 
In Federal Trade Commission v. Grolier214 the Supreme Court 
similarly discussed work product as a litigation doctrine but the facts did 
not require defining its outer limits.  The case involved a demand for 
documents under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).215  The Federal 
Trade Commission refused to provide the documents on the ground that 
they were work product in litigation, even though the litigation was over.216  
Rule 26(b)(3) applied indirectly, because the agency invoked Exemption 5 
under the statute, which excludes material that would not be available “in 
litigation with the agency.”217  The Supreme Court stated that Rule 26(b)(3) 
did not expressly address whether work product from one case retained 
work product status forever, that the Advisory Committee Notes did not 
expressly mention the issue, and that a literal reading of the rule would 
protect material as long as it was prepared for any litigation.218  The Court 
did not resolve which particular construction of Rule 26(b)(3) would 
control in a discovery dispute.  The Court did not need to do so, because 
the case could be decided under FOIA policies.219  Even though the facts of 
the case involved material that had been prepared for litigation, and the 
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opinion discussed litigation work product, the Court did not have to decide 
whether litigation work product was the only material that could be 
protected from discovery. 
B. Non-litigation Work Product in the Federal Courts 
In the years immediately after Hickman, many of the lower federal 
court opinions that discussed work product did so briefly and in discussions 
about materials such as accident reports or preexisting documents that were 
different from the attorney’s work product in Hickman itself.220  One 
opinion noted the absence of prospective litigation at the time of a 
transaction as a ground for finding discovery was not limited by the work 
product doctrine, but the discovery concerned only what the lawyers had 
done as emissaries of the client and did not concern anything like the work 
product in Hickman.221  The issue might have remained for gradual 
evolution under the caselaw, but the early cases led the student authors of 
the Harvard Law Review’s extensive review of discovery in its 
Developments Note222 to affirmatively endorse the requirement of 
prospective litigation and to provide a policy justification that was not 
directly grounded in the language of Hickman: 
Since a lawyer who does not envision litigation will not anticipate 
discovery requests, the fear of disclosure should not affect the way in 
which the material is prepared.  For example, if the owner of real 
property employs an attorney to investigate the marketability of his title 
preparatory to offering it for sale, it seems that the fruits of the lawyer’s 
search should be fully discoverable if litigation relating to a subsequent 
sale contract eventuate.  In such circumstances, as in all those in which 
a lawyer is asked to assist in planning future conduct, even though he 
might recognize the ever present possibility of litigation, he is 
prompted chiefly by his responsibility to avoid embroiling his client in 
controversy . . . .  Thereafter, the purchaser who declines to perform on 
the ground of breach of an implied warranty of title should, it seems, be 
granted access to the lawyer’s materials disclosing the encumbrance.223 
While normally a policy prescription in a student note might not 
warrant attention, this Developments Note should be examined because it 
was followed and cited by the lower courts224 and on some other discovery 
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issues by the Advisory Committee in its Note to the 1970 amendments.225  
The statement in the Developments Note of the policy supporting the 
doctrine is both a good illustration of the strongly held view that litigation 
is an essential element of work product, and an example of how that view 
leads to the conclusion that a document cannot be work product if the 
author was not anticipating imminent litigation.  The logic of the 
Developments Note is flawed at a fundamental level, because it depends on 
combining two ideas the Supreme Court had carefully separated in 
Hickman—whether the information is discoverable and whether the 
information can be discovered from the lawyer’s materials.  In Hickman the 
Court stressed that the information was routinely discoverable as a matter 
of course from the client.226  The work product doctrine of Hickman was a 
limitation on routinely discovering the information from the lawyer’s 
materials.227  That distinction, however, tended to get overlooked as various 
cases and the leading commentators continued to assert that work product 
protection was limited to material prepared for litigation and that the 
purpose of the doctrine was to protect the adversary system. 
Recent opinions illustrate that the requirement to show the documents 
were created in anticipation of litigation is still well-entrenched in the 
minds of both lawyers and judges.  For example, in one of the cases in 
which Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr sought to enforce a grand jury 
subpoena for documents created by White House attorneys, the Eighth 
Circuit held that the material was not work product.228  The Eighth Circuit 
so held because the client for whom they were working, the White House, 
did not anticipate litigation even though other non-clients might have 
anticipated various investigations.229  The tenor of the opinion suggests that 
both counsel and the court were completely focused on that issue.  The 
White House lawyers argued that an anticipated congressional hearing 
could suffice for litigation, but the court quickly rejected that as 
insufficient.230  In this case, as in courts of appeal cases that have found that 
material is work product,231 the court’s analysis is always tied directly to 
the rule’s requirement that litigation must have been anticipated. 
If the strongly held tendency to envision work product doctrine as 
protecting only the work of litigators can be suspended, it may be possible 
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to look at an emerging body of caselaw from a different perspective.  Some 
recent opinions have extended the protection of Rule 26(b)(3) to material 
prepared well in advance of any litigation.  While some commentators have 
endorsed these cases,232 others have questioned this expansion because it 
seems to go beyond protecting the process of litigation.233  There is also an 
apparent awkwardness in making the results fit within the language of the 
rule, because both courts and commentators appear unable to visualize a 
work product doctrine not tied to the language of Rule 26(b)(3) and its 
requirement that a document be prepared in anticipation of litigation.  Two 
recent opinions provide noteworthy examples. Even though they show no 
interest in exploring the uncodified branches of work product doctrine, they 
provide a factual setting for contrasting that approach with their efforts to 
extend the language of the rule. 
In United States v. Adlman,234 the document in dispute was a fifty-
eight page detailed legal analysis that had been prepared for a corporate 
attorney to evaluate the tax implications of a proposed corporate 
restructuring.  The study, written by a person who was both an accountant 
and lawyer, considered likely IRS challenges to the reorganization and a 
claim for a tax refund that would result from it.235  After the reorganization 
and the request for the tax refund, the IRS began an audit, demanded the 
document, and filed suit to enforce a subpoena for it.236  After one round of 
appeals established that the document was not protected by the attorney-
client privilege,237 the district court then denied work product protection for 
it on the ground the document was not prepared in anticipation of 
litigation.238  On a second appeal a divided panel of the Second Circuit 
reversed and remanded the case with instructions about the appropriate test 
required by Rule 26(b)(3).  The majority concluded that the trial judge 
might have applied a narrow test that would protect only documents 
prepared “primarily” to aid in litigation.  The majority recognized that this 
test had support in federal caselaw, but found it too limited.239  The 
majority held that a document could be protected even if the party had a 
business purpose for the document, if the document analyzed the likely 
outcome of litigation and it was not prepared in the ordinary course of 
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business.240  The majority directed the trial judge to use a test endorsed by 
the Wright and Miller Federal Practice treatise that protects a document 
created “because of” the prospect of litigation.241  The dissenting judge 
argued that this test would expand work product protection to documents 
prepared for reviewing a planned transaction.242 
The potential application of the test prescribed in Adlman can be 
illustrated by the contrast between an example in the opinion and the actual 
facts of the case.  The example described a publisher who was considering 
publication of a book for which a competitor asserted exclusive rights; it 
also assumed the competitor was threatening suit, so the publisher obtained 
legal advice about the likely outcome of the suit.243  The majority 
concluded that the document containing the lawyer’s advice should be 
protected as work product, a result that would not occur if litigation had to 
be the principal purpose for the document.  The opinion, therefore, held 
that it was only necessary to find that it was prepared “because of” 
litigation.244  There was no similar threat of litigation on the facts of 
Adlman, only the reality that tax liability can be disputed and that disputes 
can lead to litigation.  The litigation more likely in prospect when the 
document was prepared may have been a dispute over disclosure of the 
document itself, but it would be circular to use the prospect of that 
litigation to invoke Rule 26(b)(3).  Instead, the litigation the court must 
have had in mind was the litigation between the IRS and the taxpayer over 
the amount of taxes owed, litigation that had not begun and might never 
begin. 
The uncertain prospect for any litigation at the time the document was 
created in Adlman is similar to the facts of Upjohn.245  In both cases there 
were possible tax consequences of significant impact, and thus each 
taxpayer could credibly assert they were concerned about at least an IRS 
response and even a dispute.  In both cases actual litigation was not present, 
but the possibility of litigation is often considered by counsel when doing 
factual research, drafting documents, or advising a client about a 
transaction.  Accepting such a distant or indirect prospect of litigation as 
sufficient does provide an immediate formula for expanding the reach of 
Rule 26(b)(3), but it does so by placing some strain on the language of the 
rule. 
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A second recent opinion extending work product protection is In re 
Sealed Case.246  The issue was whether a federal grand jury could enforce a 
subpoena issued to a lawyer for the Republican National Committee who 
had worked on a 1994 transaction that was later attacked as a possible 
campaign funding violation.247  The transaction was one subject of a 
complaint that was filed with the Federal Election Commission (FEC) in 
1995; the subpoena came two years after that.248  The court said the record 
did not tell what happened to the complaint, and the court did not explain 
whether the FEC complaint was related to the later subpoena.249  The 
district court applied the “in anticipation of litigation” rule and found that 
the documents prepared before a complaint was filed with the FEC were 
not protected.250  The circuit court held that this timeline was too limited.251  
Instead, it concluded that the work product protection included documents 
prepared for a matter the client feared could lead to litigation.252  The court 
suggested such a broad rule was necessary to avoid undermining lawyer 
effectiveness at the particularly critical stage when the client needs advice 
about how to proceed lawfully or needs legal advice assessing the potential 
risks of litigation from undertaking a particular step.253 
The circuit court extracted various elements that had to be established 
to show that a document was prepared “because of the prospect of 
litigation,” concluding that the lawyer had to have “a subjective belief that 
litigation was a real possibility” and that the “belief must have been 
objectively reasonable.”254  The Court then described the choices as 
requiring either the existence of a specific claim or a broader test that 
considered all the relevant circumstances.  The court rejected the narrower 
interpretation and held that the document could be work product if it was 
created when counsel “rendered legal advice in order to protect the client 
from future litigation about a particular transaction,”255 even if there was no 
specific claim at that time.  The court expressed some concern that the 
record evidence could have been stronger on the lawyer’s subjective belief 
that there would be litigation, but found it sufficient.256  The Court also  
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found that the belief the transaction might lead to litigation was objectively 
reasonable.257 
By repeating that the work product doctrine would not include 
documents counsel prepared “in the ordinary course of business or for other 
non-litigation purposes,” the court set a limit that would exclude some 
transaction documents from its broadened standard for determining what 
might be in anticipation of litigation.258  Perhaps it is notable that at this 
point in the opinion the court was not surveying policy arguments in 
protecting the specific documents, as it had earlier, but was simply 
recounting earlier precedent from the circuit.259  On this issue, the opinion 
fits well with many others that are cited by commentators to support broad 
application of work product protection for documents prepared “because 
of” litigation even though they limit the protection by tying the analysis to 
the language of Rule 26(b)(3).260  Like other opinions, it does not appear to 
have produced any examination of whether its policy could be better 
applied by abandoning the language of the rule as the sole authority for the 
work product doctrine. 
C. Beyond the Coverage of Rule 26(b)(3) 
The extensive Advisory Committee’s Note that explained Rule 
26(b)(3) when it was adopted in 1970 is another relevant source that 
addresses whether the rule might provide the only possible protection for 
all work product.261  The Advisory Committee’s Note primarily focused on 
trial preparation material.  It described how discovery of documents had 
been limited by both the requirement to show good cause under Rule 34 
and the separate work product doctrine of Hickman.262  It concluded that 
relevance had become the usual standard for good cause, and that the 
“overwhelming proportion” of the cases that had required more than 
relevance had involved trial preparation material.263  The Advisory 
Committee’s Note then explained that the good cause language in Rule  34 
was being eliminated and replaced by the specific requirements of Rule 
26(b)(3) for trial preparation material.264  Other kinds of material were 
covered with a general conclusion: 
Apart from trial preparation, the fact that the materials sought are 
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documentary does not in and of itself require a special showing beyond 
relevance and absence of privilege.  The protective provisions are of 
course available, and if the party from whom production is sought 
raises a special issue of privacy (as with respect to income tax returns 
or grand jury minutes) or points to evidence primarily impeaching, or 
can show serious burden or expense, the court will exercise its 
traditional power to decide whether to issue a protective order.265 
The breadth of this description is not supported by any authority on 
the specific issue of non-litigation work product material prepared by 
counsel.  The factual settings in the three cases the Advisory Committee 
cited earlier for the proposition that relevance was sufficient for non-
litigation documents did not include a lawyer’s work product.266  Similarly, 
when the Advisory Committee later described material “assembled in the 
ordinary course of business” as not protected by the new rule, the factual 
settings in the two cases that were cited did not include a lawyer’s work 
product.267  The lack of caselaw in which an issue about non-litigation work 
product had been raised explains both why the Note did not discuss it, and 
why that silence does not compel a conclusion that either the Note or rule 
negate the possibility of protection for non-litigation work product. 
Some federal courts have already recognized two additions to the 
work product protection of Rule 26(b)(3).  The most common addition is 
for counsel’s trial preparation material that has not been recorded in a 
document and is just remembered by counsel.268 Although such work 
product does not fit within the Rule 26(b)(3) protection for documents and 
tangible things, it does clearly fit within the protection of Hickman.269  Less 
frequently, the suggestion in the Advisory Committee’s Note to use 
protective orders under Rule 26(c) has also been followed in a few cases 
involving work product material created by counsel for a nonparty.  The 
leading opinion is In re California Public Utilities Commission,270 a Ninth 
Circuit decision that did not allow the Commission to assert work product 
protection in a case in which it was not a party.271  It did suggest that the 
trial court could provide similar protection under Rule 26(c), on the ground 
that it would be oppressive to compel discovery of material that would 
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otherwise be characterized as work product.272  Similarly, a District Court 
allowed the United States Department of Justice to regain documents that 
were work product in one proceeding but had been inadvertently disclosed 
to a party in a different case.273  The court found Rule 26(b)(3) did not 
apply by its very terms but then found equivalent authority to protect the 
material under Rule 26(c).274 
The Advisory Committee also stated that material “assembled in the 
ordinary course of business” is “not under” the new protection of Rule 
26(b)(3),275 but it did not attempt to define that category of material in any 
greater detail.  The only two cases the Advisory Committee cited in support 
of that statement involved accident reports by non-lawyers, not transaction 
work product by counsel.276  In addition, the descriptive phrase of “not 
under” the new rule is far different from saying the material is not 
protected. In other words, the issue is not resolved by either the rule or the 
Advisory Committee’s Note, so Hickman and Upjohn could still provide a 
foundation when the federal courts address whether and how non-litigation 
work product should be protected. 
V. WHAT A THIRD OPTION OFFERS A LAWYER OR JUDGE 
The idea at the core of the third option is that the attorney-client 
privilege and work product doctrine are so inherently connected that trying 
to define the scope of the privilege without accounting for Hickman will 
inevitably go astray.  The third option is one way to describe how they are 
connected.  Doing no more than recognizing that discovery of transaction 
work product could be limited under the uncodified policy of Hickman 
would have an effect on both privilege law and discovery law, but in 
different ways.  For the attorney-client privilege it is not necessary that the 
third option be fully defined and it is not essential to know its exact limits, 
because even the possibility of this alternative and the reasons it does or 
does not protect transaction documents will provide a different perspective 
about the proper scope of the privilege.  The third option also provides a 
useful measure when sorting documents as privileged or not privileged, 
both for an attorney deciding whether to assert the privilege and for a judge 
deciding whether to sustain the assertion of the privilege.  For discovery 
law, the effect will not be as immediate because it will be no more than a 
rough sketch of a possible development until lawyers actually assert the 
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third option as the ground for withholding documents from discovery.  
Only then will judges have to decide how much of the uncodified policy of 
Hickman remains viable and define the limits of the uncodified policy. 
The third option will not matter for many items in an attorney’s 
transaction file.  The attorney-client privilege is still sufficient to protect 
the documents in the transaction file that are factual disclosures by the 
client to counsel.  That would include letters from the client to counsel that 
set out the client’s understanding of the facts involved in the transaction or 
the client’s objectives in the transaction, as well as copies of letters from 
counsel to the client that repeat the client’s earlier disclosures.  The 
privilege is also sufficient to protect documents in the transaction file that 
indirectly reveal the client’s factual disclosures, so counsel will still need to 
imagine all the various ways in which material might be used and then 
assert the privilege to protect documents where there is a reasonable 
explanation of how it might indirectly reveal what the client said. 
In every instance in which the privilege is the ground for refusing to 
disclose a document the explanation needs to be listed in the privilege log 
in sufficient detail to demonstrate to the judge that the document is 
privileged, and counsel needs to be ready to articulate a sufficient ground in 
support of the privilege.277 Although it is essential that the lawyer was 
providing legal advice, not business advice, if the privilege is to apply, it 
will not be sufficient to describe the document as providing legal advice or 
communicating with the client, because that description does not tie the 
content of the document to the client’s disclosures to counsel.  At times the 
document itself may provide clear evidence that it contains information 
from the client, but a regular flow of federal court opinions makes clear 
that the better course is to explain what makes the document privileged.278  
Where the document is a composite, such as occurs when counsel annotates 
or edits a proposed contract document, the assertion of the privilege 
requires an explanation of the source of what the lawyer wrote.279 
Both counsel asserting the attorney-client privilege and a judge ruling 
on that privilege ought to keep the categories of litigation work product and 
transaction work product in mind, because both provide a touchstone for 
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determining when a document is not privileged.  As a rough measure, work 
product includes the documents, written by counsel in the course of 
providing legal advice, which do not contain the client’s confidential 
disclosures.  This measure does not have to be an exact discriminator and is 
not the sole standard.  The privilege may not apply because the document 
involves business advice, because it was not confidential, or because 
counsel was simply sent an extra copy of a business document.280  
Nevertheless, it can provide a useful guide for sorting transaction 
documents.  A document that would be instantly recognized as work 
product, and nothing but work product, if it had been created in anticipation 
of litigation, should be regarded as unlikely to be privileged just because it 
was created earlier in time. 
Even when material looks like it is work product and appears to have 
been created by counsel well in advance of the current litigation, there are 
other tactical factors for a lawyer to consider before trying to protect a 
document under the third option.  In those circuits that have extended the 
work product protection of Rule 26(b)(3) well back in time by recognizing 
even the possibility of litigation as sufficient to find the document was 
created in anticipation of litigation,281 counsel may prefer to assert just the 
rule and the circuit caselaw to protect such work product.  In those circuits, 
the district judges or magistrate judges may likewise find sufficient 
authority to sustain the objection to discovery with the issues framed by the 
circuit caselaw. 
The initial impetus to consider the value of the third option may come 
from a lawyer or a judge—perhaps from a lawyer trying to protect 
transaction work product that does not fit even the extended interpretations 
of Rule 26(b)(3), from a lawyer in a circuit with a narrow reading of the 
rule, or from a court that recognizes the need to reevaluate the limited 
choices currently available.  There will still be more work to be done, 
because the third option provides only an alternative starting point and not 
a complete set of answers.  One core idea of Hickman was that a lawyer 
providing relevant information and a candid assessment about a legal issue 
to a client should not be worried that the result of putting that advice in 
writing would be discovery of the document in any litigation.282  That was 
not a sufficient reason to include all work product within the privilege, but 
it was sufficient to exclude it from routine discovery.  This worry about the 
same potential exposure for transaction work product might likewise affect 
how lawyers provide information to a client during the research and 
negotiation of the transaction.  Although both client and counsel might 
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hope that the transaction will become a success and that there will be no 
litigation, realistic counsel would realize that any transaction can lead to 
litigation. 
Recognizing that the transaction work product doctrine might protect 
the documents counsel wrote to inform the client about facts revealed by 
the other party, facts learned from third parties, or counsel’s drafting 
advice, would reduce the routine intrusion into counsel’s transaction file 
but not exclude all possibility of discovery.  Rule 26(b)(3) now requires 
certain procedural steps derived from the requirements of Hickman; the 
same steps could be applied by analogy to transaction work product 
protection.  Instead of the all-or-nothing result that follows from the court’s 
ruling when privilege is the basis for the objection to discovery, a ruling 
that documents are transaction work product would only exclude them 
from routine discovery.  As Hickman suggested, an opposing party might 
be able to get the same information directly from the client using other 
discovery tools;283 if so, the facts would not be hidden in the transaction file 
alone.  Even if the opposing party could not get the same information 
directly, it might not be sufficiently relevant to justify invading the privacy 
of either the attorney’s work or the attorney’s relationship with the client.  
On this issue the analogous application of the existing rule would put a 
burden on the party demanding discovery to show relevance and inability 
to obtain the information elsewhere. 
A recent decision by the Second Circuit illustrates both when the 
federal courts will limit discovery of non-litigation work product and why 
the evolution of the uncodified doctrine in these cases can be easily 
overlooked.284  The facts of In re Grand Jury Proceedings involved a 1998 
meeting of representatives of a company with officials of the Federal 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) to discuss whether the 
company was facilitating illegal firearms transactions.285  There was no 
pending litigation at the time, and the company claimed it was assured its 
limited role meant it did not need to be concerned about legal liability.286  
At the time the company’s counsel created some non-privileged documents 
and had an assistant take notes at the ATF meeting.287  A year later the 
company’s counsel testified before a grand jury about the ATF meeting but 
withheld the notes as work product.  The government moved for production 
of the notes and asked the court to bar the company from asserting work 
product protection for all documents concerning the subject the grand jury 
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was investigating.288  The district court held that the work product 
protection had been waived, found that the government had shown 
sufficient need for the notes, and ordered them produced.289  The Second 
Circuit reversed for reconsideration of the waiver issue.290 
Although the Second Circuit left the issue of whether any item was 
work product for the trial court on remand,291 it did outline some 
“Governing Principles” as a foundation for the remand on the waiver 
issue.292  Although the grand jury was investigating a criminal offense, the 
court did not distinguish the rule in criminal cases from the rule that would 
apply if the material had been demanded in civil discovery; it noted that the 
Supreme Court had “applied”293 the work product doctrine of Hickman v. 
Taylor in a criminal case in United States v. Nobles.294  The court also 
noted the different standards for fact and opinion work-product under Rule 
26(b)(3) but did not apply that Rule and did not describe the material as 
prepared in anticipation of litigation.  The relevant part of the opinion 
quoted the policy arguments of Hickman as applicable to a demand for 
disclosure of non-litigation material,295 clearly suggesting that the policy 
should apply to the documents in dispute.  While this means the facts of the 
case show a situation in which a federal court did not permit routine 
discovery of non-litigation work product, the opinion does not advertise the 
result in that way.  In that regard this opinion is similar to Upjohn,296 where 
the facts must also be read carefully to recognize the implications of the 
Supreme Court’s holding. 
As lawyers assert the third option, the extent of protection for 
transaction work product can evolve in response to the facts of various 
cases.  It may not take the twenty-three years between Hickman and Rule 
26(b)(3), but eventually there would be enough caselaw and commentary to 
suggest whether Rule 26(b)(3) needs to be expanded to cover other kinds of 
work product and whether material such as transaction work product 
should receive the same or different protection than litigation work product.  
Among the questions the courts still need to explore is the question whether 
the transaction work product category should include only the work of 
lawyers instead of the broad description of all who can create litigation 
work product under Rule 26(b)(3).  Until those details emerge, the third 
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option at least can provide an alternative to a litigant who believes that a 
lawyer’s non-privileged transaction work product should not be routinely 
discoverable, an alternative to judges who conclude there should be some 
protection from routine discovery but are unwilling to overextend the 
language of Rule 26(b)(3), and a more coherent alternative that does not 
distort the traditional scope of the attorney-client privilege. 
 
